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Abstract 
The pulp and paper industry is, nowadays, facing challenges associated with the lack of 
demand growth, pushing firms to adapt to intense competition and industry-wide 
overcapacity. In order to remain profitable and achieve sustainable competitive positions, 
industry players have relied on M&A to achieve scale and expand into growing markets in 
emerging countries. The industry concentration conducted through mergers has been able to 
deliver value to shareholders while changing the overall competitive landscape. 
This dissertation’s goal is to propose a merger between Suzano Papel e Celulose and Portucel. 
The proposition is supported by a review of the main literature on M&A, a thorough industry 
and company analysis, and a valuation of each individual firm and its combination.  
It is concluded that Suzano should acquire Portucel in an all-stock offer, valuing the Portuguese 
firm at €4.32, a premium of 55% over its 31 December 2013 market capitalization. Through the 
proposed takeover offer, Portucel would be entitled to 46% of the merged firm, with the 
remaining 54% allocated to Suzano’s shareholders.   
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1. Introduction 
In the online era we live in, where a rapid shift from paper to digital based content is observed, 
the paper industry is on the verge of reaching the decline stage. As the industry is highly 
correlated with economic environment, the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 has 
spurred a wave of bankruptcies, due to industry overcapacity and high leverage levels. Indeed, 
the structural problems the industry suffered due to stagnant or decreasing demand were 
deeply aggravated by the crisis. An industry restructuring phase ensued, which has lasted 
through to today. While some firms are able to be profitable and have sustainable leverage 
levels, others struggle to compete in current market conditions. Indeed, over the last years it 
has been proven that firms with industrial efficiency and scale struggle to be profitable, which 
has led to intense M&A activity in the industry, primarily to concentrate supply. Additionally, 
firms based in Europe and North America seek to expand to markets where growth rates are 
more attractive, typically in emerging countries, and often do so through acquisitions. 
Suzano Papel e Celulose and Portucel, the two companies under scrutiny in this thesis, are part 
of and influenced by the abovementioned industry trends. Albeit quite distinct, the two firms 
share a few common characteristics: both have a strong regional presence in the paper 
industry and a global reach in their pulp segment and both are entering a new stage of their 
lifecycle. Suzano, a Brazilian based company, has plenty opportunities to expand organically 
but is unable to source the capital required to pursue those opportunities, having a highly 
leveraged capital structure. Portucel, on the contrary, seems to have reached the end of its 
previous growth model of developing highly efficient mills in Portugal. Without opportunities 
to deploy its constantly growing cash resources, the firm is not growing nor will it in the 
foreseeable future, under current conditions.  
First, the applicable previous research on the various subjects discussed throughout the thesis 
is reviewed in the Literature Review section. Following the Literature Review, an industry 
analysis is conducted and an in-depth analysis of the two firms to be merged. Forecasts on the 
main indicators of future performance is discussed and detailed in the Forecasts section. 
Before the results of the valuation models are presented, the rationale for the proposed 
transaction is clearly explained. Both Suzano and Portucel are individually valued using two 
alternative valuation models, which are then compared and their key assumptions tested 
recurring to sensitivity analysis. After a review of recent comparable mergers which formed 
the basis to estimate synergies and integration costs, the last part of this thesis concerns the 
issues regarding the actual merger. In the merger section, synergies and estimation costs are 
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estimated and integrated in the valuation of the merged firm. Finally, the structure of the deal, 
its risks and possible competition are discussed in The Acquisition section.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Recent trends in M&A  
2.1.1 Cyclicality 
 
FIGURE 1: GLOBAL M&A VOLUME, BY YEAR. SOURCE: THOMSON REUTERS 
M&A activity is cyclical, usually following a pattern of robust growth, eventually reaching a 
peak and initiating a downward path, usually sharp and simultaneously to an economic and/or 
financial slowdown (or a crisis). M&A activity is highly correlated with GDP growth and with 
the stock market. Therefore, a downturn in the economy leads to a decrease in the dollar 
volume of mergers and acquisitions.  
The cyclicality feature of M&A can be observed from 2000 on (see Figure 1). After a peak in 
volume of $3.4 trillion in 2000, deals went sharply down to $1.2 trillion in 2002. Deals resurged 
in 2003 and M&A activity increased rapidly until 2007, reaching an all time high of $4.14 
trillion. With the 2008 financial crisis and consequent global recession, the volume again 
plummeted, to $2 trillion. Subsequent years brought about a recovery which is still distant 
from 2007 values. In 2013, the global M&A volume reached $2.3 trillion, $200 billion less than 
2012. 
With the S&P 500 in its all time high and a bull market around the globe, a KPMG (2013) survey 
shows investors are confident regarding the current M&A environment and optimist for more 
deals, both in number and volume, in 2014. The investors surveyed use three corporate 
observations to justify their expectations - companies have accumulated large cash reserves, 
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better credit terms and are avid to exploit opportunities in emerging markets. In turn, yield 
starved investors are likely to push corporate managers to pursue deals to use excess cash 
rather than returning it as dividends. 
2.1.2. Which stage of the cycle? M&A market in 2014- 2015                       
There was a general agreement that the year of 2013 would mark the return to higher levels of 
M&A, possibly reaching pre-crisis levels. However, total deal value for the year lagged 2007 
levels by a great margin, failing to reach even the 2010 figure. The activity expected for 2013 is 
set to be observed in 2014. In the first months of 2014, deals amounted to $1.2 trillion, 
comparing to $1.4 trillion over the same period of 2007.   
In hindsight, the M&A boom of 2007 proved to be unsustainable. The financial and economic 
crisis that ensued marked the end of a growth stage in the M&A cycle, and volumes 
plummeted to decade long lows. In 2014, with deal values again reaching pre-crisis figures, the 
title of this section is a question that begs an answer. To understand whether these figures will 
be sustainable is key to accurately predict if a peak is once again forming and another M&A 
market bust will follow.   
Comparing the first four months of 2007 and 2014 beyond the similarity of total values shows 
that there has been a shift in the way deals are done (Hammond, 2014). A Delloite (2014) 
study highlights the key differences between deals in both periods. Before 2007, M&A deals 
generally meant high leverage levels, with companies borrowing to finance their acquisitions 
done entirely with cash as payment method (76% of deals were all-cash in the first four 
months of 2007). In 2014, although cash is still king, more than half the deals relied 
substantially in stock as a method of payment. Another stark difference in M&A from 2007 to 
2014 concerns market perceptions. Indeed, the market perceives deals being done as more 
strategic and value-creating than before: bidder’s stock prices have since 2013 increased an 
average of 4.4% in the first day after announcement. This is quite a paradigm changing event – 
acquirers’ share prices drops when deals first come to public has been a constant throughout 
the history of M&A. Another important data point is the 30% rise in equity markets of 2013, 
compared with a stable M&A volume over the same period. Given the fact that both are highly 
correlated, the M&A volume surge in 2014 can be but a mean-reverting process, according to 
Bob Eatroff, head of M&A at Morgan Stanley US. All in all, although the recent trend formed in 
the beginning of 2014 closely mimics the trend before the crisis, the fact that the type of deals 
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have changed doesn’t allow for the conclusion that a peak has been reached and the cycle will 
turn south in the near future. 
In terms of M&A activity by sector, telecoms, healthcare, technology and real-estate sectors 
dominate in terms of weight in total value, together accounting for 52% of total value, in 2014. 
The sector with the larger share of value was telecommunications, with deals amounting to 
$252 billion in the first four months of 2014. Other sectors with relevant weight are Oil&Gas 
(6%), Construction (5%) and Finance (5%). Other sectors compose a third of global value. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: GLOBAL M&A BY SECTOR, 2014. SOURCE: FINANCIAL TIMES 
 
2.1.2 Cross-border M&A activity 
M&A is still mainly done domestically, both in developed and emerging countries. However, 
cross-border deals are increasingly popular, especially for mature firms which rely on 
acquisitions to enter new markets. In a Grant Thornton (2013) study, a third of the surveyed 
firms plan to make an overseas acquisition in the next three years, with nearly half of the 
European based firms planning to engage in cross-border M&A in the short-term future. 
Cross-border and domestic mergers alike happen for the same reason: to the acquirers, the 
combined entity is more valuable than they are worth separately. However, it is widely agreed 
that cross-border M&A is usually more challenging and complex. The added complexity arises 
from cultural and geographic differences and its adverse impact on the integration process as 
well as the imperfect integration of capital markets, namely in stock and currency markets 
(Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2010). This makes acquirers struggle to deliver expected value from 
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their acquisitions abroad: a KPMG (1999) study finds that only 17% of cross-border M&A deals 
created shareholder value. 
A key issue in cross-border deal activity is the corporate governance standards in of target 
firms. Cross-border deals are done in a stock swap when the acquirer’s country shows better 
governance, shareholder protection and transparency. The acquirer’s lower governance risk 
increases the attractiveness of its stock for the shareholders of the target company. The 
acquirer, however, is often concerned with governance risk when acquiring overseas, in the 
sense that its target might be withholding information. Using stock instead of cash as method 
of payment can, to some extent, mitigate such risk (Huang, Officer and Powell, 2014). The 
authors show cross-border deals increasingly relying on stock rather cash as main method of 
payment, presumably a consequence of the above mentioned asymmetry of information 
problem.  
2.2 Valuation Models 
Corporations exist to create and maximize value for its shareholders through investing 
resources available in order to generate returns higher than the cost of capital. A company’s 
decision making process regarding resource allocation should focus on growing as quickly as 
possible provided that growth is achieved by investments which yield rates of return higher 
than the cost of capital. To succeed, corporate managers must know how to estimate the value 
of the assets or companies being acquired. Several valuation models have been developed to 
assess value focusing on different perspectives of value creation.  
 Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt (1999) provide a framework to segment valuation 
approaches based on their focus to estimate value. Approaches such as DCF or APV assume 
that value is derived from future cash flows, discounted to the present at the cost of capital. 
Other models estimate value through the spread between return and the cost of capital as 
well as the capital invested in a firm (ROE or EVA). Finally, relative valuation models, or 
multiples based approach, are based on market forces, or, in other words, what investors pay 
for similar firms. Contingent claim valuation is a final available approach. 
2.2.1. Cost of capital estimation 
2.2.1.1 Risk-free rate (rf) 
Risk free rate is a theoretical rate of return a rational investor would expect to earn from a 
riskless investment. It can also be thought of as the minimum return an investor would expect 
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for any investment because accepting more risk would be compensated by a return higher 
than rf. 
A security with no risk must meet a certain criteria. To Damodaran (2008), it is an investment 
in which “the actual returns should always be equal to the expected returns”. In other words, 
the return on that investment must be certain, with variance equal to zero. To accomplish 
that, two basic conditions must be considered: the security mustn’t have default risk and there 
can’t be reinvestment risk. Even though, in practice, no investment has zero default risk (even 
the triple A rated credit securities have a positive, yet extremely small, probability of default) a 
government bond is usually the choice. As the argument goes, a country won’t default on its 
debt because it can print more currency to service it. Of course, there is a limit to the amount 
of currency which can be printed and there are many cases of sovereign debt defaults. Still, it 
can be safely assumed that countries like the US, Japan or Germany, to name a few, are not 
going to default on their debt obligations. Regarding the elimination of reinvestment risk, one 
simply needs to choose a zero coupon bond, thus avoiding the uncertainty of the rate at which 
the coupons are reinvested. 
Risk free rates vary with time to maturity, composing the yield curve. As cash flows of a 
company occur throughout time, the duration of the riskless rate should be matched with the 
duration of those cash flows. That would mean a one year cash flow should be matched with a 
one year zero coupon bond and a five year cash flow with a five year bond. However, argues 
that is neither practical nor necessary, mainly because the yield curve, at least in mature 
markets, is rather uniform throughout time and using a standard 10 year risk free rate yields 
similar results (Damodaran, 2008). 
2.2.1.2 Market Beta 
Beta coefficient is a measure of non-diversifiable risk, capturing the exposure of a security to 
the overall market price volatility. A theoretical portfolio composed by all the assets in the 
market has a beta of one. If one such asset has higher volatility than the market portfolio, it 
has a beta higher than one. Conversely, if one of the assets which compose the market 
portfolio is less volatile than the overall portfolio, it has a beta lower than one.  
The concept of beta is particularly important in asset pricing theory and a component of most 
asset pricing models, namely the widely used CAPM, first introduced by Sharpe (1964). CAPM 
assumes that the expected return of an individual security is a function of systematic risk, 
while non-systematic risk shouldn’t be rewarded with additional expected return because it 
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can be diversified away (Sharpe, 1964). The beta coefficient calibrates the model to account 
for systematic risk.  
Although CAPM is most frequently used, other theories have been developed which challenge 
it. One such theory is the arbitrage pricing theory. This theory’s basic intuition lies on the 
assumption that an asset return can be predicted through a linear function of a series of 
macro-economic variables, the betas. The major difference to CAPM is that the APT allows 
multiple explanatory variables (Ross, 1976).   
More recently, Fama and French (1992) found that market betas fall short of capturing the 
cross section of expected returns. The authors compare CAPM with an asset pricing model 
which relies on two additional variables: size and book-to-market equity. This model 
outperforms the traditional model solely based on market beta, thus providing evidence that 
asset pricing models can perform better with additional beta coefficients.  
2.2.1.3. Market Risk Premium (MRP) 
Three different ways to estimate market risk premium exist (Fernandez, 2004). The summary 
definition for those three alternative concepts is: 
- Required market risk premium: “The incremental return of the market over the risk-free rate 
(return on treasury bonds) required by an investor”; 
- Expected market risk premium: “The expected differential return of the stock market over 
treasury bonds” 
- Historical market risk premium: “The historical return of the stock market over treasury 
bonds” 
The first two, required market risk premium and expected market risk premium, change with 
investor’s assumptions and beliefs. The third should be the same for all investors.  
Regarding historical market risk premium, the calculation of MRP based on historical data has 
been developed more sophisticated models have been developed and tested due to some 
problems with this method. However, despite the importance research as awarded to this 
topic, there is a variety of MRP estimations in academic literature based on this technique, 
many yielding significantly different results, contrary to what would be expected. The different 
estimations constitute a con of this method and happen due to a lack of agreement on the key 
inputs of the model: 
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1. Which timeframe? While some use rather small periods (10 to 30 years), based on the 
argument that the investor risk aversion changes throughout history and thus older data is 
outdated, others base their calculations on data going back almost a century. The latter find a 
cost in the use of a shorter timeframe, which is the larger impact of noise. Indeed, some 
authors believe this figure must be stable overtime and should not react to stock market 
shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis. Nevertheless, the literature has arguments in favor of a 
figure which adapts rapidly to new market realities. 
2. Which risk-free rate? Indeed, there are two alternatives: whether to use a short or 
long term security. The normal yield curve is upwards sloping, meaning the return increases 
with longer maturities. Although the yield curve can invert or flatten, it can be generally said 
the use of a short term risk-free rate overestimates MRP relative to the use of a longer term 
rate. Furthermore, the risk free rate used in computing MRP should be the same used in 
computing CAPM. As the standard in valuation is to use a ten year bond rate, that is the most 
appropriate rate for MRP estimation (Damodaran, 2013). 
As an alternative, the expected MRP is a forward looking measure which depends on investor 
analysis of present/past conditions to predict the future. Estimating MRP with this approach 
involves surveying investors on the premiums that they either use or acknowledge as correct. 
The answers constitute a sample whose average can be thought of as the expected actual 
MRP. To come up with the most reliable estimate, the entities surveyed should be those with 
most influence in the market. A survey answered quarterly since 2000 (until the end of 2012) 
by US CFOs, with 17,507 answers, shows that CFOs change their expectations of the risk 
premium over time, depending mainly on the economic environment (Graham and Harvey, 
2013). During the 2009 recession, the MRP stood at its highest (4.78%) while in periods of 
strong US GDP growth the figure is on average around 3.5%. By the end of 2012, the average 
estimate stood at 3.83% In a similar study, finance professors, analysts and company officers 
(financial and non-financial) were asked which MRP figure they used for 2012, with a total of 
7,192 answers. The US average figure was 5.5%, close to the average for the rest of the 
developed world (Fernandez, Aguirreamalloa and Corres, 2012). There is a significant 
difference between these two figures, which highlights the main limitations of this estimation 
method: 
1. Which survey respondents to target in order to gather a representative sample; 
2. Survey results are extremely volatile; 
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3. The survey can yield an unjustifiable figure, like a negative or a double digit MRP 
figure. 
2.2.1.4. The cost of equity in emerging markets 
In developed markets, the cost is widely estimated through CAPM, although not without the 
controversy mentioned above. This controversy was shown to have roots in the works of Fama 
and French (1992) and Ross (1976). Regarding emerging markets, these models are deemed 
unfit because emerging markets are not be fully integrated in the global financial markets 
(Harvey, 1994). Markets are integrated if there aren’t barriers to cross-border trade, capital 
flows and foreign investment in domestic financial markets. While developed markets 
integration is imperfect, because legal and market imperfections subsist, emerging markets 
often have restrictions concerning the flows of goods and capital with the rest of the world 
which severely limit its integration in global financial markets. 
The implication of that violated assumption, which constitutes the basis of most asset pricing 
models, is that assets with same level of risk won’t necessarily have similar expected return 
because assets in non-integrated markets won’t be available for a global investor. 
Furthermore, emerging markets often experience other types of risks which don’t normally 
occur in developed markets. These country specific risks include expropriation and political 
risk, among others. There is evidence that these markets not only are exposed to specific risks 
but that common risks factors used in asset pricing models perform poorly in emerging 
markets. The conclusion following is that the cross-section of expected returns of non-
integrated, emerging markets is influenced by local information rather than by global 
information (Harvey, 1994). 
Confronted with this, the literature has developed several alternative asset pricing models 
specific for emerging market valuations. One approach is estimating the cost of equity based 
on downside risk (Estrada, 2000). This approach builds on the CAPM to incorporate a downside 
risk measure, which is given by the semi deviation of returns to the mean returns in a world 
market benchmark. This approach consists in adapting the risk premium in CAPM to 
incorporate the risk spread between a non-integrated market and the global market.   
 
RM = ∑B 
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Where,  
B is the semi deviation of returns with respect to a benchmark 
R is the return of a security 
T is the number of observations in the sample 
RR is required return 
Rf is the US risk free rate 
RPw is the global risk premium 
Another approach is to add a country risk premium to the cost of capital to reflect the 
additional risk an investor incurs investing in a market with specific risks such as economic, 
political and/or legal risks (Damodaran, 1999). The assumption implied in this approach is that 
the cost of capital should be higher when valuing companies in emerging markets which in 
turn indicates that the marginal investor – or the investor which is able to invest in all 
investable assets globally – should be rewarded with a higher expected return. As Modern 
Portfolio Theory dictates, an investor should be rewarded by systematic risk, while he 
shouldn’t expect additional return from incurring in non-systematic risk, as it can be diversified 
away. Because CAPM is based on this assumption (as well as other asset pricing models), 
adding a country risk premium implies that risk cannot be diversified away and thus this 
approach is valid only if one accepts that the country risk incorporated in the cost of equity is 
systematic risk. The country risk premium is added to the equity premium of a mature market, 
usually the US equity risk premium (Damodaran, 1999). Country risk premiums can be derived 
by a country’s sovereign debt rating (from rating agencies). The default spread in which ratings 
are based captures the risks of a country’s debt. However, debt holders are exposed to much 
the same country risks as equity holders, namely currency risks, political and/or a regulatory 
risk, which leads to this approach’ central assumption that default spreads are a good proxy for 
measuring country risk premium.  
A third approach is to build probability-based scenarios which reflect the impact on cash flows 
should an adverse event (e.g. expropriation, war) materialize (Koller et. Al., 2010). In this 
approach, country specific risk is modeled directly in the cash flows rather than the cost of 
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equity. It has theoretical support because country specific risks are deemed non-systematic 
(the marginal investor can diversify away the risk of expropriation, for example), so they 
shouldn’t influence the cost of capital but rather the cash flow projections. The first step to 
apply the method is to identify the events with non-zero probability of having an adverse 
impact on the company’s cash flows. Then, an estimation of that impact must be developed. 
Risks must be translated in actual changes in the cash flows to come up with a valuation for 
the different scenarios. These can be constructed as variations of a base, “business-as-usual” 
scenario. Lastly, probabilities must be assigned so that the method yields a weighted average 
valuation, in which all risks and its probabilities of occurrence have been accounted for. All 
these valuation models share not only the same ultimate goal but also the same underlying 
model. Consequently, these approaches should yield the same result, although each focuses 
on different components (Young, Sullivan, Nokhasteh and Holt, 1999).  
2.2.1.5. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
Cash-flow based valuation models incorporate the cost of capital to incorporate risk and return 
into the valuation model. Indeed, cost of capital is the cost of the funds invested in a business 
to finance its operations. Capital can be sourced either from debt holders or equity holders 
and each of these capital holders have a broad range of securities to invest in the firm. A firm 
can be entirely financed by either equity or debt or, more commonly, by a combination of 
both. Thus, the cost of capital to use in most firms is a weighted average of the cost of equity 
and the cost of debt, the WACC rate. As interest payments are tax deductible while dividends 
aren’t, the after-tax cost of debt is used. 
The after-tax WACC formula is Arditti (1973): 
 
Where:  
E and D are the market values of equity and debt, respectively, and E + D = V 
Re is the cost of equity 
Rd is the cost of debt 
Tc is the corporate tax rate 
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The cost of debt is calculated by the market interest rate the firm must bear to borrow in 
normal conditions. The cost of debt for a corporation depends on the risk of the debt holder 
losing some or all the value lent. Consequently, the cost of debt Rd is equal to the risk-free rate 
plus a default spread, given by the firm probability of default in the future. The default spread 
is usually given by the firm credit rating, issued by credit rating agencies such as S&P or 
Moody’s. Estimating the credit rating of a firm can be done through its interest coverage ratio 
(EBITDA/Interest payments) Korteweg (2007). 
The cost of equity is not as straightforwardly observable as the remaining variables. While the 
target capital structure (D and E), tax rate and cots of debt is readily available for most firms, 
the cost of equity calculation is more dependent on the methodology chosen and theory used 
as a basis. Finance practitioners have established the use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) to calculate the cost of equity: 
 
Where: 
Rf is the risk-free rate 
β is the market beta 
(Rm – Rf) is the market risk premium 
The formula shows that the cost of capital is a function of risk-free rate and an added 
component of risk, given by beta and the expected market risk premium. The components of 
CAPM have been discussed in the previous sections.  
Valuation Models 
2.2.2. Dividend Discount Model 
Dividends are the main cash flow derived from equity securities accruing to common 
shareholders. Dividends are a function of a firm’s earnings, its growth and timing, thus the 
equity value of a firm is largely determined by its earnings and dividends paid. Despite being 
related to earnings, evidence shows that managers target a long-term payout ratio, given by 
dividends as a percentage of earnings (Lintner, 1956). Consequently, dividends are not only 
determined by earnings growth but also by political decisions within the firm, which set the 
target payout ratio based on the belief that it will be sustainable and maximizes stock price.  
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A contradicting view is that managers target a steady growth rate of dividend yields rather 
than a fixed payout ratio (Brav. Et al., 2005). However contradicting, the findings of Brav ET al. 
corroborate the fact that dividend payments are not only related to earnings growth but also 
to political decisions of firm’s managers. 
The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) is developed on the basis that the value of a common 
share can be estimated through the expected dividends per share discounted at the discount 
rate investors require in a given moment. The equation which captures that relationship is:  
 
Where: 
Et [Pt] – Expected price an investor is expected to pay for a common share in period t 
Di – Nominal annual expected dividends per common share at time i 
Rt – The required return for investors at time t, i.e., the cost of equity 
Forecasting dividends in the long-run lacks precision as uncertainty grows with time. As such, it 
is customary to use this model – as well as most other valuation models – in two stages. The 
first stage, often deemed the estimation period, uses actual information firm information to 
estimate dividends by period. The second phase is the terminal value, calculated assuming a 
constant dividend growth rate in perpetuity. The appropriate discount rate to input in this 
model is the cost of equity, in this thesis calculated through CAPM.  
An alternative approach is the ROPE model which, in contrast with the DDM, yields dividend 
figures by estimating return on equity (ROE) and payout ratios (Rozeff, 1990). The difference of 
this model lies in the assumption that dividend growth rate do not decline over time, as the 
DDM typically assumes. The ROPE model states that as firms mature, ROE decreases while 
excess cash generation increases, as positive NPV projects to invest shrink. As such, the fall in 
ROE is compensated with a larger payout ratio. The net result is that dividends per common 
share are either maintained or increase as firms mature, finds Rozeff (1990). 
2.2.3 Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
The Adjusted Present Value approach starts by valuing a project or a firm as if entirely financed 
with equity. Under this method, one analyzes the value of the project derived by the business 
separately and then calculates and adds the value created by financing decisions. 
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Modigliani-Miller proposition I has laid the ground for Myers’s (1974) APV valuation model 
proposal. The theorem states that, ignoring taxes and other financing side effects, capital 
structure has no impact whatsoever on firm’s value. However, in the presence of taxes, the 
value of the firm can be increased by replacing debt for equity and increasing the weight of 
debt relative to equity in the capital structure. The added value comes from the tax 
deductibility of interest payments which does not occur in dividend payments. 
To Luehrman (1997), APV performs better than the WACC approach as it “always works when 
WACC does, and sometimes when WACC doesn’t, because it requires fewer restrictive 
assumptions. APV is less prone to serious errors than WACC. But most important, general 
managers will find that APV’s power lies in the added managerially relevant information it can 
provide.” Indeed, this approach allows the user to separate firm value into different 
components. The first step is to value the company’s operating and investment cash flows. The 
discount rate used to get the value of those cash-flows in the present is the unlevered discount 
rate, which reflects the risk of the company financed only with equity. This rate is commonly 
obtained using CAPM. The second step is the calculation of the financing side effects. There 
exist five potential sources of value accretion/destruction arising from capital structure 
decisions, which include interest tax shields, cost of financial distress, subsidies, hedges and 
issue costs (Luehrman, 1997). 
To calculate interest tax shields for a given level of debt, the value of the tax shield is equal to 
the present value of the interest tax savings, discounted at the cost of debt (Cooper and 
Nyborg, 2006). Although it is argued that the riskiness of the tax shields is the same as the 
riskiness of debt, there are special cases where this is considered incorrect. An alternative is to 
use a higher discount rate, the cost of assets usually, to discount tax shields of firms in financial 
distress or going through a highly leverage transaction, namely an LBO.  
The financing side effects are also captured through the estimation of the expected bankruptcy 
costs. Damodaran’s (2010) formula highlights the two components of the expected bankruptcy 
costs. Multiplying the probability of a firm going bankrupt in the next period by the cost of 
such event retrieves the theoretical cost of bankruptcy of that period. This cost will be either 
the bankruptcy cost or zero, depending on whether bankruptcy actually occurs.  
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The probability of bankruptcy is a rather obvious concept. Its estimation is, however, far from 
simple. Damodaran (2010) provides two alternative estimation techniques. The first is to either 
use bond ratings assigned to the firm or estimate the bond rating based on debt levels, and 
use the default probabilities assigned to each rating. Alternatively, one can use a statistical 
approach based on firm specific characteristics, corresponding to a debt level and set of 
characteristics and probability of bankruptcy, based on historical bankruptcies of firms with 
similar figures. 
The other part of the equation which must estimated are the costs associated with a 
bankruptcy, if such event were to happen. Modigliani-Miller (1958) proposal states that, 
without taxes and the possibility of bankruptcy, no capital structure can be considered 
optimal. Stieglitz (1969) proves that the proposition holds with probability of bankruptcy, as 
long as there are no costs associated with it. Bankruptcies are costly to the firm, however. 
Specifically, it is commonly assumed that the costs associated with a bankruptcy fall into two 
broad categories: direct and indirect costs.  
Indirect bankruptcy costs include lost sales, lost profits and higher cost of credit, or the 
inability to issue securities at a reasonable cost. A problem with these costs is its measurability. 
Altman (1984) uses a regression to measure the difference between estimated profits and 
actual profits. The difference is the bankruptcy cost (direct and indirect costs). This author also 
presents a technique based on analysts’ expectations. 
Direct bankruptcy costs are fairly straightforward to measure. These include legal and 
accounting fees and managerial time spent on the bankruptcy process. The literature is 
contradictory in the estimates of the average amount of these costs relative to firm value. 
Warner (1977) finds that these costs are quite small, estimated at about 1% of firm value, 
based on a sample of railway companies. It follows that direct costs of bankruptcy shouldn’t 
have a significant weight on capital structure choice, although not to be entirely mustn’t be 
ignored. Altman (1984) argues that the sample used by Warner (1977) is narrow and not 
widely applicable, proposing a different analysis which yields direct bankruptcy costs of 6%, 
leading to the conclusion, even without accounting for indirect costs, these are significant and 
cannot be dismissed from decisions on capital structure. Furthermore, his findings suggest 
costs of bankruptcy, both direct and indirect, can exceed 20% of firm value just prior to 
bankruptcy and between 11% and 17% when measured three years prior to bankruptcy. These 
costs are thus very significant to capital structure decision making. 
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2.2.4. Relative Valuation  
Valuation using multiples is a widely used technique across investors, bankers and academics 
alike. In this model, a multiple of firm value (e.g. P/E, EV/EBITDA) is multiplied by a 
performance measure (e.g. EBITDA, Net Income, EBITA) to estimate the value of the firm. To 
ensure a proper multiples valuation, there are some rules in constituting the peer group. A 
peer group must be composed of companies in the same market, competing for the same 
customers, exposed to the same macroeconomic forces and with similar growth and return on 
capital. These characteristics create a homogeneous group because these firms have cash-
flows with similar growth expectations and level of risk. 
Once the peer group is chosen, it is important to be consistent with the inputs to calculate the 
multiples. Indeed, several adjustments might have to be made in order to make multiples truly 
comparable: 
- Operating leases: Firms which resort to operating leases as a means of financing will have an 
artificially low enterprise value (assets and debt are not recognized) as well as EBITDA (leasing 
expense includes interest and is recognized as operational). In order to accomplish fair 
comparisons, one must add the value of operating leases to EV and add implicit interest to 
EBITDA, for firms which use operating leases. 
- Pension expenses: Firms have pension plans, which are basically assets put aside to fulfill a 
future liability, which is the retirement compensation to its employees. The expected return on 
those assets, together with pension expenses, offsets pension liabilities. Because the expected 
return is a management’s choice, two firms with similar pension plans can have different 
pension expenses. 
- Excess cash and other non-operating assets: Non-operating assets should be excluded from 
EV as they are not used by the company to conduct its business. 
 
FIGURE 3: ENTERPRISE VALUE AND EBITA ADJUSTMENTS 
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Multiples based on forecasts work substantially better than multiples based on historical data, 
which have little capability of pricing IPOs. When forecasts are available, forward-looking 
multiples perform superiorly, yielding results much closer to the actual pricing of the IPO than 
using historical data (Kim and Ritter, 1999). The existing research points to an agreement 
regarding this issue: forward multiples provide better estimations of firm value than historical 
multiples. Valuation theory provides further support to forward multiples: value comes from 
future cash-flows. 
Lastly but perhaps most importantly, a multiple must be chosen. While it is generally argued 
that the right multiple varies across industries, there exist multiples which perform best for 
most industries while others perform poorly regardless of industry or firm characteristics (Liu, 
Nissim and Thomas, 2001).  
The price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple is very popular among investors and usually reported in 
the media. This goes against empirical evidence´, which styates that this multiple is flawed and 
inaccurate, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the capital structure of a firm has an impact on net 
income and thus on the multiple, while evidence suggests that a multiple performs better 
when it only depends on operational earnings. Secondly, net income is also affected by non-
operating items, such as one-time expenses (gains). These items distort the multiple as they 
incorporate the effect of one-time only expenses (gains) which lead to an artificially high (low) 
multiple. A way around these shortcomings is to use a multiple which focuses only on the 
operational component of earnings, EV/EBITA. By ignoring non-operating items as well as 
capital structure, one can compare firms based only on their operating performance. 
  
 
2.2.4.1. The Multiples Puzzle  
Executives are often puzzled by the valuation the market attributes to its stock. These 
executives belong to companies which have higher growth and return on capital than their 
peers and should thus, according to finance theory, be awarded a higher multiple. Although 
this is theoretically correct, the market seems to persist attributing similar multiples to each 
firm in a peer group. A possible explanation is that investors believe a firm outperforming their 
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peers is unsustainable, and value these firms assuming higher growth rates and return on 
capital will fade away and converge with the industry (Foushee, Koller and Mehta, 2012). 
Empirically, it has been observed that true peers – groups of companies in the same market, 
exposed to the same macroeconomic forces and with similar growth and return on capital – 
will converge in terms of revenue growth: a company outperforming its peers today is unlikely 
to continue to do so in five years (Foushee, Koller and Mehta, 2012). This explains why peers 
have similar multiples, even though they don’t have similar growth and ROIC. 
One of the main reasons for this phenomenon is how firms sustain abnormal growth rates. 
Firms growing often accumulate excess cash, which they use to make acquisitions. These 
acquisitions support growth and profitability, but acquiring firms must often pay a premium to 
convince target’ shareholders to sell. This premium over book value of the assets acquired 
generates goodwill. Operating returns exclude goodwill. The premiums paid, over book value, 
for acquisitions lower ROIC. Investors believe that goodwill will keep on reducing ROIC of all 
companies in the industry, thus attributing similar multiples to the peer group (see figure 4). 
The exceptions are usually companies which prove to investors their superior business model 
and superior capabilities. 
 
FIGURE 4: ROIC, WITH AND WITHOUT ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL. SOURCE: THOMSON REUTERS 
2.2.5. Conclusion 
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This thesis focuses on cash flow and relative valuation models. According to Damodaran 
(2002), the DCF approach is the basis of any valuation. Furthermore, Luehrman (1997) shows 
that APV is a useful tool and highlights information which are only implied in DCF approach. 
Lastly, Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2005) refer the importance of using the multiples 
approach simultaneously with a cash flow based approach to improve its performance. 
2.3. M&A-related topics 
2.3.1. Return for shareholders 
Mergers generally create economic value. Although the disparity of returns is high, depending 
on firm characteristics and the external environment, total shareholder return is, on average 
positive upon a merger (Bruner, 2005). Beyond whether M&A creates economic value, 
research has focused on the division of wealth created among acquirers and acquiring 
shareholders. Research points to the fact that the distribution of the gains in a merger is 
asymmetrical, skewed to favor acquired firm shareholders. Bruner (2005) concludes that 
shareholders of firms earn, on average, substantially larger returns than what was expected in 
an equitative distribution. The author also finds that, albeit shareholders within acquiring firms 
tend to profit little from acquisitions, they still manage to earn their return on investment rate. 
Acquiring firms hand-in most of the value created in a merger through the premium paid, thus 
retaining a relatively smaller share of value created. 
Another way to look at this issue is by measuring market response, in the form of returns, to 
deal announcements. By studying the market performance of acquiring firms over a period of 
six years, Sirower and Sahni (2006) reach similar conclusions to Bruner (2005). Their research 
shows that acquirers had a return of -4.1% after the deal announcement. Furthermore, initial 
market response was found to be persistent over time. One year after the merger, acquirers 
maintained roughly the same return, at -4.3%. The opposite also holds: initially positive returns 
were still positive a year later.  
In conclusion, there is strong evidence that M&A creates economic value and that it is 
asymmetrically distributed among target and bidder’s shareholders. Indeed, acquiring firms 
give away most of the synergies resulting from a merger to acquired shareholders, as the 
premium they pay to convince the target to the merger is often too high. 
2.2.2. Payment Method 
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M&A transactions are typically of large size, comparing with the firm’s assets or revenues. 
Consequently, how a firm finances acquisitions has a large impact on the acquirers capital 
structure, namely ownership and financial leverage. The method of payment chosen, be it 
equity or debt, has severe impacts beyond capital structure, in areas such has taxation, 
corporate control and risk management.  
From the above, it is understandable that managers and stakeholders face important decisions 
which can have deep consequences in firm value. The method of payment chosen for a deal is 
one such key decision. The choice between cash or stock as the deal currency is analyzed as a 
trade-off. If cash is used, leverage is required, which increases the cost of financial distress, 
diverts leverage capacity from other projects and can decreases managerial flexibility (e.g. 
through debt covenants). However, there is value created through tax shields and the acquirer 
is able to retain control over the merged entity. Although a stock deal is unlikely if the acquirer 
wants to preserve control, it is an attractive payment method if leverage capacity is either 
limited or available on relatively expensive terms, if the bidder’s shareholders do not assign 
much value to corporate control or if there is tax advantages (e.g. the ability to defer tax 
liabilities). 
Faccio and Masulis (2004) performed an analysis on the trade-off between the use of cash and 
stock deals, weighing in corporate control against leverage limitations. The authors conclude 
that evidence suggests that the incentives to retain corporate control and use cash are strong 
when there are controlling shareholders of the bidder. Their analysis takes also into account 
market-to-book value of the bidders’ assets and share price behavior. These factors are found 
to be statistically significant explanatory variables for the chosen payment method. 
2.2.3. Synergies 
When two companies merge their combined value is usually greater than if those two firms 
operate independently. The additional value generated is synergies. These can take the form 
of operational synergies – such as economies of scale, greater pricing power and new growth 
potential – or financial synergies – such as tax benefits, efficient use of excess cash and 
diversification gains. Diversification as a source of financial synergy is possible although many 
argue that investors can diversify more efficiently on their own thus making this an inefficient 
and redundant move. Furthermore, the bidder often lacks the skills needed to run the target 
firm which can lead to worst performance of the acquired company. In turn, managers of the 
bidder can lose its focus thus affecting the performance of the acquirer, too. Doukas, Holmen 
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and Travlos (2001) find not only that investors are aware of these problems and react 
negatively to a deal with the intent of diversification but also that they are usually proven 
right, as the performance of the bidder deteriorates after the merger is completed.  
Synergies create value either through an increase in cash flows or a decrease of the cost of 
capital of the combined entity. The value of the combined firm generally increases after the 
merger Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). However, merging two firms can also destroy value, 
which is known as reverse synergies. In this case, the expected performance of the 
independent firms is adversely affected by the merger thus resulting less valuable merged 
entity. 
Sound valuation of synergies is a critical success factor in any merger. This is rather complex 
because the acquirer can lack information about the target business and it relies on many 
assumptions regarding the future. It is also important to separate synergy value from value of 
control to avoid double counting. 
Valuation should be done through a DCF analysis. The first step is to list all the expected 
synergies as well as the costs associated with them. Managers must assess synergies according 
to the costs required to secure them. Then, a timeframe must be developed to list those 
synergies in chronological order. While some synergies can be reaped almost immediately, 
others take longer. Failing to acknowledge this in the cash flow estimation leads to an 
inaccurate valuation which in turn can lead to a premium offered too high.  Thirdly, both 
companies must be valued as independent entities. Finally, subtracting the value of the sum of 
both firms from the value of combined entity equals the value of synergies.   
Additionally, accretive acquisition can be a motivation for engaging in an acquisition. Although 
its underlying assumption is that investors are irrational, the proposed value creation logic is 
that acquiring with lower earnings multiple than the acquirer will increase the multiple after 
the acquisition, matching the acquirer’s. That would translate into an immediate capital gain 
for the acquirer, once the merger was concluded. 
2.2.3.1. SVAR 
Synergies result from the performance improvements and value created when two firms are 
combined in a merger. Although synergies can express themselves in a number of forms, most 
commonly through increased revenues, cost reductions or lower cost of capital, ultimately, 
they are reflected in the present value of future cash-flows. These must be calculated before 
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deal is done and often without knowing the acquired firm in large detail. Besides the 
uncertainty of synergy materialization, evidence that acquirer’s pay too much for their 
acquisitions led to the need of developing a tool to measure how much acquiring firms’ 
shareholders stand to lose if the synergies proposed fail to materialize after integration.  
The SVAR is a tool to calculate synergy risk relative to shareholders’ wealth (i.e. market value 
of equity) (Sirower and Sahni, 2006). To compute SVAR, the premium paid is divided by the 
acquirer market value before the merger. The result is the percentage of shareholders’ equity 
at risk if synergies end up being null. In an all-stock deal, the formula is adjusted to incorporate 
the fact that the acquirer will only bear the synergy risk corresponding to its equity in the 
merged firm. 
2.2.3.2. Operating Sense of Synergies 
The success of a merger depends largely on the ability of the acquirer to increase the value of 
the merged companies so that the premium paid for the target’s shares is compensated by 
synergies and value of control. In other, words acquirers must meet the premium paid in the 
acquisition by cost or revenue synergies. So boards and managers should understand which 
cost decrease and/or revenue increase is required so that the premium paid is met, therefore 
making the merger worthwhile for the acquirers (Sirower and Sahni, 2006). The authors 
propose a method which resembles a breakeven analysis – by looking at the improvements in 
the bottom line sufficient to, at least, generate value equal to the premium paid. This analysis 
assumes that the already expected performance improvements as stand-alone businesses 
should not be included and must not be adversely affected by the merger, because this 
performance is already accounted for in the stock price, not the premium. 
The method aims at informing about the required improvements which must take place with a 
simple formula which relates the premium offered, EBIT and cost and revenue synergies. 
 
Where, 
%SynC is the required percentage cost decrease to justify the premium 
 
   
  is the pretax profit margin 
%P is the percentage premium offered 
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%SynR is the required revenue increase to justify the premium 
This formula yields a range of possible combinations of cost and/or revenue synergies which 
compose the MTP (meet the premium) line. If the expected synergies fall below the line, then 
the merger will destroy value for the acquirer, at the premium currently offered. In turn, the 
expected synergy mix should always be above the line. To expand on this analysis, the authors 
question the cost base which can realistically be changed as well as the potential revenue 
improvements – which are usually much harder to anticipate and materialize in the short term. 
To address this question, the authors recommend looking at similar deals and at the cost 
structure of the business in order to generate a maximum plausible synergy mix, which values 
beyond are unrealistic. The premium offered must then be justified by improvements within 
the plausible range of synergy mix, or the Plausibility Box – values beyond the plausibility box 
can be the result of too optimistic assumptions. 
 
FIGURE 4: MEET THE PREMIUM LINE . SOURCE: (SIROWER AND SAHNI, 2006) 
 Sirower and Sahni (2006) consider a third question – is the combination of cost and revenue 
synergies proposed in the MTP method achievable in operating terms? The authors suggest a 
follow up of the proposed synergies which fall within the plausibility box based on the strategic 
nature of the deal and the type of assets and capabilities being brought together.  
To answer the question, they developed a matrix relating the type of market access and 
capabilities of both parties. The matrix’s intent is to assess whether the synergies are viable 
given two parameters being evaluated, market access and capabilities. If the merging 
companies compete in different markets, then the merger will result in access to new markets 
for both firms. Conversely, if those companies are competitors, they can either improve their 
market access or it can remain unchanged. A similar analysis is performed on the capabilities 
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side. A merger can result in new capabilities for one or both firms but it can also improve or 
maintain them. 
 
FIGURE 5: CAPABILITIES/MARKET ACCESS FRAMEWORK. SOURCE: (SIROWER AND SAHNI, 2006) 
 
The characterization of the deal based on the matrix is followed by the categorization of the 
deal. There are four options: 
1. Efficiency: The prospective merger brings together two similar companies in terms of 
market and capabilities. A deal of such kind should yield virtually no revenue synergies 
only elimination of redundant costs and scale economies (costs synergies).  
2. Enhancement: Two companies with similar market access and capabilities can merge 
to form a company better positioned in competitive terms. These deals should form a 
cost and revenue mix, with scale economies combined with increased sales and new 
customers. 
3. Expansion: When the overlap of capabilities and market access is limited but the 
companies improve their competitive positioning or expand into new segments, the 
deal results in mostly revenue synergies. However, cost synergies can still be reaped. 
4. Expeditions: Deals between companies distinct from each other should have the 
strategic rationale of increasing revenues, mainly through cross-selling. Expeditions 
happen when acquirers seek companies in different markets and fundamentally 
different business models than their own. 
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The authors propose this method to assess the potential synergies yielding from a deal. It 
should be used as a basis of discussion to the synergy mix, bearing in mind that if the synergy 
mix differs substantially from the category’s indicative synergy mix, its underlying assumptions 
must be reassessed. 
3. Industry Review  
3.1. Supply analysis 
3.1.1. Introduction 
The paper industry is capital intensive because the need to build production infrastructures, 
mainly paper and pulp mills, as well as distribution infrastructures, such as roads, railways and 
ports. The industry has been in decline in many of its segments, originating periods of excess 
capacity. Capacity available is quite constant over time because mills have a useful life of more 
than 30 years. However, the constant need to be efficient and innovative, driven by low 
margins across most segments, requires large investment in fixed assets periodically, when 
mills must be shut down and rebuilt to gain more efficiency.  
3.1.2. Industry Mergers & Acquisitions 
The industry relies on M&A to grow and achieve scale and scope. Organic growth is limited as 
opportunities are scarce in this mature and saturated industry. Firms in the western world are 
actively seeking higher exposure to fast growing emerging markets, experiencing stable or 
declining demand at home coupled with excess capacity. Consequently, the bulk of the 
investment in this industry is captured by emerging markets with comparative advantages vis-
à-vis mature economies. The US-based International Paper acquisition of SCA’s Asian 
operations is an example of that.  
Another industry trend, dating back almost a decade, is the consolidation of supply in Europe 
and the US, as firms look for scale to improve margins. The 2010 UPM acquisition of Finnish 
firm Myllykoski was completed with the main strategic rationale being improving profitability 
through building scale.  M&A is also driven by deals intended to retire capacity of the market. 
There is persistent over capacity in mature markets across most segments, which drives down 
prices. To counter this, the major players are acquiring competitors and shutting down their 
older, inefficient mills. International Paper announced in the end of 2013 the shutdown of its 
largest paper mill, citing shrinking demand due to switch to online format and the need to take 
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capacity off the market. In China, similarly, tackling excess capacity has been conducted 
through a government program mandated to shut down inefficient paper and pulp mills.  
3.1.3. Business Segments 
The global paper and pulp industry competes with other industries in the procurement of 
wood, its main raw material. There are a few different types of wood which are transformed 
into cellulose, the main component of most kinds of paper apart from recycled fibers. The 
industry’s output can be segmented into five groups of products: Printing and writing paper, 
newsprint paper (used in newspapers and magazines), tissue paper, container board (used in 
paper packages) and other types of paper and paperboard (paper bags, filters, etc). The scope 
of this thesis only concerns the printing and writing paper segment, the only type of paper 
produced by Portucel and the main type produced by Suzano. This segment has similar raw 
material (wood logs) but its transformation is quite distinct from other segments. The end 
users as well as the distribution channels are also different which makes this segment a rather 
independent business from the rest of the industry. 
 
FIGURE 6: PULP AND PAPER INDEX PRICES. SOURCE: FOEX INDEXES 
The industry is primarily composed of integrated paper producers. An integrated producer has 
industrial units with a pulp and paper mill connected. Once the raw material is transformed in 
the pulp mill, into pulp, it directly enters the paper mill. This means that paper mills which 
source pulp from elsewhere are an exception. This organization of production is optimal 
because pulp prices are volatile while paper prices tend to be constant over time (see Figure 
6). The industry’s inability to pass higher input (i.e. pulp) costs to customers has led to the 
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costs and, consequently, unpredictable margins. This has led to many firms experiencing 
financial problems in the past as firms are usually highly geared in this industry.  
Firms could simply hedge input price volatility recurring to contracts or financial derivatives. 
However, firms chose to hedge through producing and stocking a part or the whole of their 
pulp needs. The chosen hedging mechanism has to do with costs associated with sourcing pulp 
externally which are not occurred in the integrated production system. Pulp has a high 
percentage of water in its composition. To produce paper, pulp must retain a high degree of 
water composition. However, transportation of wet pulp is too expensive due to its weight, 
substantially higher than the weight of dried pulp. As a consequence, to reduce transportation 
costs, pulp is dried before shipping. When it reaches its final destination, the paper mill, the 
dried pulp has to be splashed with water to regain the desired humidity. The cost of doing this 
is eliminated in the integrated production system which confers a cost advantage to integrated 
firms.  
There is still a global market for pulp. The main players are firms which have excess/deficit of 
pulp as paper production input for their own mills and paper firms which are not integrated, 
around 15% of total firms. 
3.1.4. Industry Consolidation  
 
FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF MILLS AND TOTAL PULP PRODUCTION VOLUME IN EUROPE. SOURCE: CEPSI 
The industry has been going through a trend, since the beginning of the XXI century, towards 
supply consolidation. Although it is an industry wide trend, it has been experienced in larger 
degree in the mature markets of North America and Western Europe. Indeed, either through 
M&A activity or bankruptcy, the number of mills has been decreasing while production has 
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been stagnant or increasing, depending on the region. China has instituted a set of incentives 
to close down old, inefficient mills while developing new, larger units. 
Europe’s trend has become very pronounced since 2007 – while production of pulp production 
has picked up again after 2009, reaching 96% of the 2000 figure by 2012, the number of mills 
was reduced by 30%, from 2000 to 2012 (see Figure 7). This clearly highlights the trend 
towards the development of new mills with enough scale and efficiency to be profitable while 
old and smaller mills, typically running at a loss, are gradually being closed down. Mill closures 
accelerate as soon as pulp prices decrease.  
3.2. Demand analysis 
3.2.1. Printing & Writing paper: trends and forecasts 
 
FIGURE 8: DEMAND OF PRINTING & WRITING PAPER BY REGION IN VOLUME. SOURCE: POYRY 
Suzano Papel e Celulose and Portucel both focus mainly in the Printing & Writing Paper 
segment so this analysis focuses mostly on that segment. 
Global Printing & Writing Paper demand, in volume, grew 0.2% per year in the last three years. 
Poyry, a consultant firm, forecasts that this growth will increase to 0.4% until 2019. However, 
demand trends vary considerably across geographic segments. North America and Western 
European markets have been shrinking at a relatively fast pace and will continue to do so in 
the foreseeable future. From 2009 to 2013, estimates point to a yearly 3.8% and 3% decrease 
in quantity turned over in North America and Europe, respectively. Global growth in the 2009-
2013 triennium is coming from emerging markets such as Asia (CAGR = 3.3%), Eastern Europe 
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(CAGR = 3.1%) and Latin America (CAGR = 2.3%). Over the next five years, these markets will 
keep growing, although at a slower pace, forecasted to be around 2% (see Figure 8). 
3.2.2. Demand shift to environmental-friendly products 
Deforestation is an issue currently raising a wave of social awareness worldwide due to its 
harmful effects on the environment, namely on wildlife natural habitats and CO2 emissions 
into the atmosphere. As such, environmentally aware consumers, a growing segment of the 
market, are shifting their preferences in terms of paper products towards recycled and 
environmentally-friendly types of paper. Besides recycled paper, customers tend to opt for 
wood free paper (UWF paper has 10% or less of hardwood pulp in its composition) and 
chemical free paper. This trend has been accompanied by paper manufacturers – recovered 
paper (i.e. recycled paper) globally has grown by 45% from 2001 to 2011, adding another 70 
million tons to the 2001 figure of 150 million tons. Although consumers drove this trend, 
companies in fiber-poor locations also found in wood free and recovered paper a way to lower 
their wood and pulp import needs. In China, a country which has a large deficit of wood and, 
consequently, pulp relative to its paper production and consumption, was responsible for 
more than half the 70 million tons increase in recovered paper production between 2001 and 
2011.   
3.2.3. Country economic development and paper consumption growth 
 
FIGURE 9: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF TISSUE PAPER. SOURCE: RISI 
Paper products consumption is highly related to GDP per capita. In 2013, the consumption of 
tissue paper is highest in countries where GDP per capita countries is highest, such as the USA, 
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Canada or western European countries, while consumption is a fraction of that in developing 
countries such as Latin American and Asian countries. This is explained by the disposal income 
households have in wealthy countries as opposed to relatively poorer countries. In the former, 
consumption of packaged products, use of tissue paper and printing & writing paper is larger 
due to the consumption habits of households and firms alike. In the latter, disposal income is 
directed towards more essential products and there are substitutes, cheaper products which 
are used albeit their intrinsic lower quality. As economies develop, consumers tend to adapt 
purchasing habits similar to the ones wealthy countries currently have.  
The relatively low consumption of paper products in developing economies allows potential 
for demand growth for most of the paper segments, reason why forecasts point to larger 
growth rates in those countries than in developed countries, which are forecasted to be 
stagnated throughout the future. 
4. Company Review 
4.1. Suzano Papel e Celulose 
Suzano Papel e Celulose is a Brazilian based company controlled by Suzano Holding (57% of 
capital structure in March 2014) and traded in the Brazilian stock market (BOVESPA), with a 
free float of 41% (March 2014 figures). Its market capitalization stood at R$ 9.3 billion on 
March 2014. 
Suzano is a forestry-based company which operations include pulp and paper production and 
forest land management, mainly composed by eucalyptus wood. It has a total of seven plants, 
three of which (Mucuri, Suzano and Limeira) are integrated, one (Maranhão) produces only 
market pulp and two produce paper (uncoated and paperboard). For the sake of comparison, 
all values are expressed in euros. 
4.1.1. Revenues 
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FIGURE 10: TOTAL REVENUES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Suzano achieved revenue CAGR of 6.8% throughout the five year period between 2009 and 
2013, from €1.43 billion to just below the two billion euro mark (€1.99 billion in 2013). This 
figures lacks explanatory power as growth didn’t follow a stable trend throughout the period – 
from 2009 to 2010, with the expanded capacity installed and the global economic recovery, 
revenues surged 35%, supported by the higher capacity available and the recovery of 
economic activity. In 2011 and 2012, revenues were stable, slightly over €2 billion.  
Growth was sustained throughout the period, despite a weak economic recovery and the 
worsening of industrial activity - and the economic activity, in general - in Brazil.   This has been 
accomplished through greenfield investments in the development of new industrial units, as 
well as expanding the existing units. The output of those units is extremely competitive not 
only in Brazil but also in international markets, because of Suzano’s efficient mills and 
environmental characteristics which make Brazil the country in the world where eucalyptus 
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FIGURE 11: INTEGRATED PAPER REVENUES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Having generated 57% of its revenues from paper in 2012, Suzano Papel e Celulose revenues 
were 55% derived from paper products in 2013. Paper sales were decomposed by 22% from 
paperboard products used in packaging and 78% from printing and writing paper. In 2013, for 
the printing and writing paper segment, uncoated paper was worth 78% of sales while coated 
paper was worth 22%, similar to 2012. These sales confer the company the leading position in 
terms of market share in the paperboard and coated paper segments as well as the runner-up 
position for the uncoated paper segment. Specifically, Suzano has 28% of the paperboard 
market in Brazil as well as 36% and 38% of the Brazilian coated and uncoated paper market, 
respectively. Besides the domestic market sales, which account for 48% of total sales, the 
company generates 52% of its revenues abroad. 
Suzano wasn’t able to sustain, in 2013, the value of paper sales achieved in 2011 and 2012. 
Sales grew by 14% from €1,072 million in 2010 to €1,219 million in 2011. 2012 saw a 2% 
reduction in sales value while in 2013 sales went down to €1,091 million, thus leading to a 
CAGR of 5.1% throughout the five year period. While sales values decreased in 2013, paper 
sales in volume, as well as production volume, remained quite stable since 2011. The 9% 
revenues drop of 2013 is mostly due to the 7% drop in average price paper sold (from €890 to 
€830 per ton). 
4.1.1.1.2. Production, sales volume and capacity 
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FIGURE 12: PAPER PRODUCTION, SALES AND CAPACITY IN VOLUME. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Sales in volume were actually marginally higher than production throughout the entire period, 
consequence of the inventory accumulated during 2010. In terms of capacity, Suzano’s plants 
can produce up to 1,290 thousand tons of paper (all three varieties combined) per year since 
2011, when the expansion of one of its mills was concluded, increasing capacity by 200 
thousand tons a year. During the period between 2011 and 2013, the firm was able to operate 
at full capacity, reflecting the ability to monetize all its production into sales with relatively 
ease.  
4.1.1.1.3. Positioning in Brazil 
 
FIGURE 13: MARKET SHARE IN BRAZIL BY SEGMENT. SOURCE: COMPANY INSTITUTIONAL PRESENTATION 
The Brazilian paper market is concentrated on its three main segments: coated paper, 
uncoated paper and paperboard. A few key players – Suzano Papel e Celulose, Klabin, Fibria 
and International Paper - hold more than 50% of the market share in the uncoated and 
paperboard segments, while a group of 10 companies produce nearly all paper consumed in 
Brazil. While in both the previously mentioned segments imports account for a minority of 
1287 1311 1293 1290 1290 1290 1335 1347 1312 
FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Paper Production, sales and capacity volumes, in 
thousands of tons, 2011 - 2013 
Paper Production Installed capacity Paper Sales
41 
Vitor Oliveira  M&A: Portucel and Suzano Papel e Celulose 
consumption, half the coated paper consumed domestically is imported as Brazillian firms 
apart from Suzano, which holds 40% of the market, do not typically produce coated paper. 
Apart from the leading position in the coated paper segment, with 40% of the market, Suzano 
also leads the paperboard segment, with 29% market share in 2013. Also in 2013, the firm 
achieved a 36% market share in the uncoated paper segment (see Figure 13).  
Besides holding the leading position in all paper segments domestically, Suzano also distributes 
its paper products overseas. In terms of geographical diversification in 2013, it is clearly 
observable that the firm is focused in South America – 69% of paper is sold in Brazil and 
another 13% is sold in the remaining countries of South and Central America, thus 82% of sales 
are made in the region. In addition to regional sales, it sells 5% and 12% to Europe and North 
America, respectively. Overall, it can be concluded that Suzano has a large domestic and 
regional exposure, in its paper business segment, contrarily to the pulp segment, where sales 
are spread throughout the globe. 
4.1.1.2. Pulp 
 
FIGURE 14: TOP 10 PULP PRODUCERS, BY VOLUME. SOURCE: HAWKINS WRIGHT (2014) 
Suzano is set to achieve the status of the world’s fourth largest player in terms of pulp capacity 
in 2014, when the expansion of one of its mills (the Maranhão mill) is concluded. Capable of 
producing 3,4 million tons of pulp, the scale achieved by this Brazilian firm is only matched by 
3 other firms (see Figure 14). The Brazilian territory contains, by far, the most productive forest 
lands in terms hardwood production – one hectare of eucalyptus planted in Brazil yields 41 m3 
of hardwood annually, which compares with an annual yield of 31 m3, 15 m3 and 6 m3, for 
China, the USA and Finland, respectively. Being the main component in pulp production, 
hardwood cost has a relatively large impact on the cash cost of pulp. In turn, the cost of 
hardwood depends largely on the yield one can achieve from their planted forests. In light of 
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these facts, it is no surprise that Brazil is able to produce the cheapest pulp in the world. The 
most recent figures available point to an average cost of $350 per ton of pulp produced in 
Brazil, while the same amount would cost $523 in the US. As pulp is a commodity whereby 
producers are price takers, players compete mainly on price, thus making firms operating on 
areas with low pulp production costs more profitable. While this might be the case for Suzano, 
its success is not exclusively due to its privileged location. The firm evolved into a large and 
complex organization specialized in managing eucalyptus forest lands, operating state-of-the-
art pulp and paper mills and distributing its production throughout the globe. 
4.1.1.2.1 Revenues        
 
FIGURE 15: PULP REVENUES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Pulp sales were €904 million in 2013, up 3.3% from €875 million in 2012 (see Figure 15). The 
CAGR for the period stood at 1%, from €867 million in 2010, similar to the figure for sales in 
volume (CAGR = 1.1%). Similar sales growth rates in volume and value indicate that the third 
variable, average selling price per ton of pulp, has remained stable throughout the period. The 
average selling price per ton of pulp was €479 in 2011, €474 in 2012 and €478 in 2013, in line 
with the price from the benchmark BHKP. 
4.1.1.2.2. Production, sales volume and capacity 
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FIGURE 16: PULP PRODUCTION, SALES AND CAPACITY IN VOLUME. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
Pulp installed capacity increased from 1,750 thousand tons in 2010 to 1,920 in 2013, a 10% 
increase occurred in 2011, consequence of the expansion in one of their industrial units. 
Following came the expansion of Suzano’s Maranhão plant, which conclusion is expected by 
the end of 2014, adding 1,100 thousand tons of annual pulp capacity to the company, a 57% 
increase from its current figure. With this investment, the Maranhão plant will reach the 
Mucuri plant in annual pulp capacity, at around 1,500 thousand tons.  
Regarding pulp production, the firm has been operating at full capacity since 2010 through to 
2013. In fact, production even slightly exceeded capacity in 2010 and 2013. The lowest 
production volume relative to capacity installed was recorded in 2011, when it stood at around 
95%, still far above the industry running average of around 70%. In 2012, this figure increased 
back to around 98%, making 2012 an isolated figure reflecting the fact that the organization 
was merely accommodating the increased capacity. As capacity didn’t increase from 2010 
onwards, the output of pulp has remained stable throughout the period. The CAGR was 2%, as 
production increased every year during the period, from 1,780 thousand tons in 2010 to 1,920 
thousand tons in 2013. 
In terms of quantities sold, Suzano sold all its output produced in the period, between 98% and 
99% of its production throughout the period in analysis. These figures should not be surprising 
in light of the firm’s production being equal to its capacity – under normal conditions, the firm 
produces only what it can sell.  
4.1.1.2.3. Geographic Segment 
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FIGURE 17: PULP SALES BY GEOGRAPHIC SEGMENT. SOURCE: COMPANY INSTITUTIONAL PRESENTATION  
Lastly, in terms of geographic segment, the Brazilian based firm serves a wide range of 
customers throughout the globe. These customers are typically non-integrated paper 
producers, or integrated paper producers running a pulp deficit, which source their pulp needs 
from the international pulp markets, of which Suzano is one of the key players. Only 22% of 
total pulp sales, in volume, were sold domestically, in 2013. About a third of the firm’s 
customers are located in Europe and another third in Asia, in terms of volume purchases. 
North America and South and Central America were the remaining export markets in 2013, 
with 10% and 1% share, respectively (see figure 17). 
4.1.2. Costs 
4.1.2.2. Cost of Goods Sold 
 
FIGURE 18: COGS. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 
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Cost of Goods Sold ARE the total costs used to create a product or service, which has been 
sold. These costs fall into the general categories of direct labor, materials consumed, 
and overhead. In the pulp and paper industry, COGS are mainly composed of factory workers 
wages and other related costs (direct labor), wood and/or pulp purchases, chemicals, energy 
and other products used in the production process (materials consumed) and overhead costs 
which are fixed costs which are incurred despite the level of production. 
The cost of goods sold CAGR amounted to 5, 64% in the 5-year period between 2009 and 2013, 
beginning at €1,117 million, in 2009, peaking in 2011, at €1,622 million, and going down to 
€1,469 million in 2013 (see figure 18), similarly to the path of revenues, which grew faster than 
costs, at 6.8%. As revenue growth outpaced COGS growth, the firm’s gross profit margin 
improved, dictated by a lower proportion of COGS in revenues. The cost of the products sold 
was 77.9% of the price Suzano got for those products, in 2009. In other words, the firm spent 
close to €0.78 in producing each €1 of product sold, thus making a gross profit of €0.22. In 
2010, this ratio improved significantly – the firm generated close to €2 billion in revenues 
spending €1,352 million producing its products (paper and pulp), thus improving the 
proportion of COGS to revenues to 69.8%, i.e., making a gross profit of roughly €0.30 for each 
euro of pulp and paper revenues. 
The increase in the period was primarily due to the increase in units sold. Besides that, wood 
prices have went up since 2012 and real exchange rate against the dollar has been devalued. 
Although this drives up the competitiveness of its products abroad, thus allowing for price 
increases, the production products that Suzano must import, namely chemicals, become more 
expensive. Lastly, fixed costs dilution also played a role in improving the proportion between 
revenues and fixed costs. 
4.1.2.2. Operating Costs 
4.1.2.2.1 Sales Expenses 
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FIGURE 19: SALES EXPENSES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
Sales expenses amounted to €88 million in 2013, down 8% from €96 million in 2012. As a 
percentage of revenues, the situation improved – selling expenses decreased by 0.2% from 
4.6% to 4.4%, consequence of the implementation of cost control processes and actions, which 
are set to continue in the future as further cost efficiencies are achieved.  
4.1.2.2.2. General and Administrative Expenses 
 
FIGURE 20: GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
General and Administrative expenses were down 0.3% to 6.6% in 2013, consequence of the 
implementation of newly created cost control processes, which also decreased sales expenses, 
and due to the reduction of expansion projects spending. Overall, these expenses stood at 
€132 million. 
4.1.3. EBITDA (Earnings before interest, depreciations and amortizations) 
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FIGURE 21: EBITDA. SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS, COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
EBITDA was positive throughout the period, although never reaching the maximum of €720 
million in 2010. For that reason, CAGR was negative (-2.4%) despite EBITDA growing by 29% 
from 2012 to 2013, from €508 million to €654 million. EBITDA captures the operational 
profitability of a business, leaving aside financing and the replacement cost of its assets in 
place (depreciations). Therefore, the results achieved over the period are explained by changes 
in the various components of its operational revenues and expenses. Furthermore, being a 
company which exports and imports a very substantial share of its inputs and outputs, 
respectively, exchange rate changes, particularly the behaviour of the Brazilian real vis a vis the 
US dollar, have a deep impact on the operational results of the firm. From 2012 to 2013, the 
Brazilian real depreciated vis a vis the US dollar. Because the firm has substantially higher 
exports than imports, in value, a weaker real is beneficial for the firm, because more expensive 
imports, in real terms, are more than compensated by more valuable exports, in real terms. 
Besides the depreciation of the real, which contributed to improve the results in 2013, pulp 
and paper prices increased in the international markets, improving the average selling price for 
the firm’s pulp and paper products. Wood costs also rose in Brazil, having an adverse effect on 
the firm, which is a net buyer of wood. A fourth contribution to the improved results over the 
last year has an endogenous nature. As it was previously highlighted, Suzano launched cost 
cutting initiatives which streamlined processes and increased productivity. That translated into 
lower sales, administrative and general expenses, as a percentage of sales, which in turn led to 
a higher EBITDA.  
4.1.4. CAPEX 
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FIGURE 22: CAPITAL EXPENDITURES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
Capital expenditures went from €259 million in 2010, amounting to 13% of revenues, to 
€1,054 million just one year after that, more than half the value of revenues. This was the 
consequence of the investment in the new pulp mill in Maranhao, which was developed from 
2011 to 2013. However, the bulk of the investment needs were in 2011 and 2012. In 2013 
CAPEX decreased to €583 million. With the new mill project concluded, investments will 
decrease sharply, as they have rose from 2010 to 2013. Other CAPEX needs include energy 
investments in biomass plants integrated in the pulp and paper mills, investments in the 
logistics department of the firm. Furthermore, investments in updating and increasing the 
efficiency of assets in place are also a constant. The firm has no project of developing a new 
industrial unit in the foreseeable thus CAPEX will become majorly allocated to the 
abovementioned areas. 
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4.1.5. Working Capital 
 
In terms of the length it takes for Suzano’s clients to pay for sales, since 2010, each year it 
takes the company longer to receive payment for its sales. While in 2009 it took a client an 
average of 72 days to liquidate an invoice, in 2010 that time went down 9 days, to 63 days. 
Afterwards, the average length, in days, increased by 6 to 7 days, a year, reaching 83 days in 
2013. A constantly increasing length of sales outstanding is adverse for the firm, which has to, 
ceteris paribus, invest more in working capital – thus diverting cash flows from servicing the 
high debt pile to investment in working capital.  
The average number of days inventories are kept internally was 69, in 2013, up from the 
minimum of 60 days, in 2012. The CAGR was minus 4.9%, reflecting a downward trend 
observed since 2009 until 2012. Suzano’s average number of days of inventory outstanding is, 
and is likely to be, similar at least two months for two main reasons: on one hand, because 
they source their production inputs from abroad, therefore ordering in large quantities to 
bring down transportation costs per unit while achieving better pricing, i.e. quantity discount. 
On the other hand, the firm cannot extract its raw material just-in-time for pulp production – 
the forests must be managed in a sustainable way and there are times of the year when they 
must extract wood to stock for other periods of the year.  
Accounts payable are also increasing as a proportion of COGS, at a faster growth rate than 
sales, starting at 38 days in 2009 and reaching 78 days in 2013 (CAGR = 15.3%, see figure XX), 
catching up with the average length of sales outstanding.  
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4.1.6. Debt 
 
FIGURE 23: INTEREST-BEARING LIABILITIES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
The firm nearly doubled its debt outstanding over the past four years, from €2.3 billion to €4.5 
billion, approximately, a CAGR of 18.3%. The firm has borrowed from banks as well as from the 
capital markets, in the form of bonds and debentures. Export financing, which composes the 
bulk of current debt, has banks as counterparts. Long term debt is typically borrowed from the 
capital markets, both domestic and internationally, mostly in US dollars denominated markets.  
Suzano has experienced a fast growing debt pile in recent years due primarily to the 
development of the large scale project of the Maranhão unit – the largest single project the 
firm has ever undertook. The project, which required an investment of nearly €2.5 billion, 
financed  by long term debt, was very demanding due to its relative large scale – the pulp mill 
will double the value of assets allocated to the pulp segment and pulp annual installed capacity 
will increase by 80%.  
By 2013 the new plant will be concluded and the installed capacity is forecasted to be rapidly 
fully used, thus boosting earnings and increasing free cash flows. The firm has accumulated 
large amounts of debt since 2010 and, according to the information in the annual report of 
2013, the situation will be reverted from 2013 onwards, i.e., a deleveraging process will ensue.  
4.2. Portucel 
Portucel owns and operates pulp and paper mills and manages forests in Portugal. 
Additionally, a pulp plant in Mozambique is under the development stage, in line with the goal 
of geographical diversification of production. The output of the Mozambique’s plant will be 
market pulp, to be sold in the international markets, namely Asia. In Portugal, it owns three 
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plants (Setubal, Cacia and Figueira da Foz), producing uncoated printing & writing paper and 
bleached eucalyptus kraft pulp. At the end of 2013, the company had 2,259 employees. In 
terms of ownership structure, SEMAPA controls approximately 75% of the issued shares while 
6.56% are allocated to treasury stock. The company is listed in the PSI 20, the main Portuguese 
stock index, with a float of 26.4% of outstanding shares. The company had a market 
capitalization of €2,563.5 million as of 09/04/2014. 
4.2.1. Revenues 
 
FIGURE 24: TOTAL REVENUES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Portucel achieved all time high revenues of just over €1,550 million in 2013. These results 
reinforced the stable revenue trend since 2011 – CAGR stood at 1.4% in the 2011 to 2013 
period. Expanding the analysis into the last five years, CAGR increases to 6.6%, from 2009 to 
2013. In fact, revenues grew 24.4% from 2009 to 2010 and 7.8% from 2010 to 2011. 
The uneven growth path of Portucel’s revenues can be explained by looking at two key 
variables – paper prices and installed capacity. Portucel derives most of its revenues from 
paper products, which price tends to be stable throughout time. On the other hand, the 
company’s plants have operated near full capacity throughout the 2009 – 2013 period, as well 
as in a more distant past. This scenario in which the company operates yields persistently 
stable revenues as long as the company does not invest in expanding its installed capacity. 
Indeed, stable prices and output volume are the reason for stable revenues since 2011. By 
contrast, the large investment the company made in increasing its capacity substantially 
before 2009 allowed double digit growth in the 2009 -2011 period (CAGR = 10.3%). Pulp 
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capacity, on the other hand, stood at 1,337 thousand tons. The company’ lack of capacity 
dictated stagnant revenue since 2011. 
Overall, it can be concluded that Portucel’s growth was organic in the last five years, the result 
of a greenfield investment in a new paper mill and improvements in the efficiency of existing 
assets. Analyst consensus and company managers agree that a growth model based on organic 
growth domestically will be difficult to maintain because of lack of raw material – Portugal has 
a very limited output of eucalyptus wood, not enough to supply Portucel.  
4.2.1.1 Revenue by product  
Portucel is an integrated producer, consuming around 80% of the pulp internally produced 
(only the pulp output from the Cacia mill is market pulp). With the opening of the new paper 
mill in Setubal, Portucel was able to integrate more pulp output into its paper production 
operations. Consequently, a gradual decrease in the weight of pulp was counterbalanced with 
a steady increase of the weight of paper in Portucel’s total revenues, from 2009 to 2013.  
Also under expansion during the period was the company’s energy production from biomass. 
The company increased revenues in this segment from €86 million to €180 million (CAGR = 
20.2%), from 2009 to 2012, respectively. Portucel has a permanent deficit of wood which 
explains the residual and shrinking sales of woodchips. Overall, it can be observed that the 
company became more integrated and energy self-sufficient throughout the period. 
4.2.1.1.1. Paper  
 
FIGURE 25: INTEGRATED PULP AND PAPER REVENUES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS  
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Portucel derives its paper revenues from uncoated printing and writing paper (UWF paper). 
The benchmark for its paper prices is the FOEX PIX A4 B Copy price index. Portucel paper prices 
were relatively stable throughout the period, reflecting the stable behavior of the benchmark 
index. However, the new mill in Setubal, Europe’s most efficient mill and one of the largest of 
its kind in the region, has brought another 500 thousand tons of capacity to the existing 295 
thousand tons, in 2009. This has made revenues for the integrated paper division surge 46% 
from 2009 to 2013 (from approximately € 833 million to € 1,218 million), a 7.9% CAGR (see 
figure 25).  All in all, Portucel expanded from 1,050 thousand tons of annual paper capacity in 
2009 to 1,595 thousand tons in 2013, due primarily to the new mill but also to efficiency 
improvements in the existing mills. Portucel has managed to operate at full capacity over the 
whole period. The company was able to swiftly sell all its new output resulting from the 
increased expansion – full capacity was reached in late 2010, a year after the new mill started 
operating, and this was sustained throughout subsequent years.  
4.2.1.1.2. Paper revenue by market segment 
 
FIGURE 26: PAPER REVENUES BY MARKET SEGMENT. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT  
In terms of product mix, Portucel strategic positioning is to expand its sales in premium 
segments, marketed under their proprietary brands (also known as mill brands). Portucel has a 
55% weight of premium products in its product mix, which compares with 17% average for its 
European peers. Proprietary brands, on the other hand, allow Portucel to minimize distribution 
costs and capture the margins for the whole paper value chain. In 2012, 62% of its sales were 
from own brands, directly sold to retailers and end users. European paper producers sold a 
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quarter of its products through proprietary brands, reflecting a larger reliance on third party 
distributors to handle the downstream activities of the value chain. 
4.2.1.1.3. Pulp 
Portucel’s UWF type of paper is produced with bleached eucalyptus kraft pulp as an input. 
Because of their ongoing integration efforts, the company only produces this type of pulp. 
Most of it, around 80%, in 2013, is internally consumed by its paper mills and the remainder is 
market pulp. The benchmark for pulp selling prices is the FOEX PIX BHKP index. 
 
FIGURE 27: PULP REVENUES AND PULP PRICE INDEX. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS AND FOEX INDEXES 
Portucel sold approximately € 163 million of BEKP (bleached eucalyptus Kraft pulp) in 2013, 
8.3% more than in 2012 (€ 151 million). Throughout the 2009 - 2013 period, the CAGR was 
0.4% although sales declined in 2011 and recovered in 2012 (see figure 27). To understand the 
rather volatile behavior of pulp sales in this period, one must again turn to market prices and 
installed capacity. Pulp is a commodity which shares the typical feature of most commodities – 
producers are price takers, meaning pulp producers are subject to market prices they cannot 
control. Therefore, Portucel’s pulp sales price is, to a large extent, set by the FOEX PIX BHKP 
index. This index shows that pulp price is very volatile, typically peaking in unsustainable levels, 
where most non-integrated paper producers generate a loss on their production, followed by 
price decreases in periods where paper production decreases, creating limited demand for 
pulp.  
Pulp capacity had a slight increase (2.8%) over last five years, to 1,375 thousand tons result of 
investments to improve and retain efficiency in the three existing mills. Similar to its paper 
mills, Portucel operates at full capacity in its pulp segment. Setubal and Figueira da Foz pulp 
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and paper mills are integrated – not only does all the pulp produced in these two plants is 
integrated, but pulp needs have actually been higher than the output, since 2012. To fill that 
gap, a part of Cacia’s production has been integrated, the rest being market pulp. Overall, 
around 15% of pulp is sold and 85% integrated. Expansion of existing plants or development of 
new plants is not a viable option in Portugal, according to Portucel’s management, as the main 
raw material, eucalyptus wood, is not available domestically and can only be imported at 
prices which would make the project unprofitable. 
Portucel new, state-of-the-art paper mills allow the company to operate at full capacity even 
though most of its European peers face excess capacity. Efficiency and scale economies result 
in substantially higher margins than the European industry average, around 11%. EBITDA 
margins for the last three years (2010 – 2012) were kept similar to historical levels. These 
levels of profitability were achieved through efficiency gains in the new paper mill which offset 
the higher costs of wood due to the lack of this raw material availability in Portugal 
4.2.1.1.4. Revenue by geographic segment 
The European region is the main market for Portucel products. Its revenue share decreased by 
2%, from 80% to 78%, although sales in the region grew 9.9% annually, from 2009 to 2012. 
Sales also grew in the remaining regions: in America, sales grew 21.7% per year and 11% of 
revenue came from the region in 2012 while the Rest of the World segment, mostly composed 
by  Asian countries, remained rather constant in terms of share but grew 9.3% in the period. 
Overall, the high exposure to regional markets characteristic of paper companies can be 
observed in Portucel.  
 4.2.1.1.5. International Expansion 
Portucel’s limited ability to grow organically in Portugal and the Iberian Peninsula pushed 
management to consider and pursue overseas projects in emerging markets. Portucel has 
made a greenfield investment in Mozambique to develop an integrated eucalyptus plantation, 
pulp and energy project estimated at $2.3 billion. The phase I of the project, an eucalyptus 
plantation covering 60,000 ha, is already undergoing and has the potential to reach 350,000 ha 
of forest land. The plant’s development is expected to start when the forestry operations are 
ready to yield enough raw materials for the plant’s operation. Sales of these operations will be 
mainly pulp to Asian countries, such as China and Indonesia. According to a 2013 corporate 
presentation, Mozambique’s investment is part of the strategic vision of Portucel focused on 
expanding operations into Africa and Latin America, close to available forest land and high 
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growth paper and pulp markets. However, this project is still in its inception and won’t 
generate revenues in the foreseeable future. 
4.2.2. Costs 
Portucel’s operational costs were up from just over € 1 billion in 2010 to € 1.215 billion in 
2013, a CAGR of 5% in the period. Revenues had a CAGR of 2.6% over the same period, 
meaning costs increased faster than revenues, thus crushing operating profits. To understand 
Portucel’s operational cost structure, its evolution and correlation with revenues throughout 
the 2010 – 2013 period, an analysis of its operational costs segmented by nature and by 
product is due. 
4.2.2.1. Costs by nature 
 
FIGURE 28: TOTAL OPERATIONAL COSTS. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Operational costs grew by 5% a year from 2010 to 2013, from just over €1 billion in 2010 to 
€1.215 billion in 2013. These costs include mainly three items, similar to what happens in most 
industrial firms:  costs with inventories, costs with materials and services consumed and labor 
costs. Although other types of costs exist, they are not materially relevant, therefore this 
analysis focus only on the abovementioned three components. Portucel maintained a rather 
stable operational cost structure throughout the period.  However, the key components of the 
operational cost structure of this industrial firm changed overtime, consequence of both 
internal and external factors.  
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Consumed inventories are mainly composed of raw materials consumed in the paper and pulp 
making process – namely eucalyptus wood as pulp production input and pulp as paper 
production input. Furthermore, several types of chemical products are consumed in pulp and 
paper mills (e.g. chemicals which color paper). Consumed inventories represented more than 
half of its operational costs, ranging from 52% to 54% throughout the period. Overall, these 
costs had a CAGR of 6% in the period, from €517 million to €660 million. This increase is 
justified by an increase in the price of eucalyptus wood, which has to be increasingly sourced 
outside Portugal as well as the boost in paper chemical prices in recent years. 
Salaries and employee costs weight on total operational costs decreased from 13% to 9%, in 
2010 and 2013, respectively. Put another way, these costs decreased from €127 million in 
2010 to €114 million in 2013, a CAGR of -3%. In a context of rising production and revenues, 
this value clearly shows that Portucel managed to increase its productivity in the period while 
labor costs in Portugal decreased as a consequence of the economic crisis. 
4.2.3. Operational Profit 
 
FIGURE 29: EBITDA, DEPRECIATIONS AND EBIT. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS.  
EBITDA offers a clearer reflection of operations by stripping out expenses that can obscure 
how the company is really performing. It excludes interest payments – and thus capital 
structure decisions – and taxes. In addition, it ignores depreciation and amortization expenses, 
which have subjective calculation procedures, sometimes being misleading.  
In 2013, the EBITDA fell short of the 2012 figure (approx. €336 and €400 million, respectively), 
a sharp 16% fall, breaking the stable trend of results observed since 2010.  Although revenues 
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grew throughout the period, costs grew at faster pace, pressuring the margin downwards. And 
despite the fact that operating margin fell from 28% in 2010 to 22% in 2013, Portucel still 
outperforms its European, and global, peers (the industry EBITDA average stands at around 
11%) (See Figure 29). 
4.2.3.1. Operational Profit by product 
 
FIGURE 30: OPERATIONAL PROFIT BY PRODUCT SEGMENT. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS   
Most of Portucel’s operations are dedicated to paper and pulp production. As a consequence 
of the latter being mainly integrated into paper production, most of the profits (59% in 2013, 
and 54% in 2012) are generated by the paper business. The margin for this segment, however, 
declined 3% in 2013, after being stable in the previous three years. This was a consequence of 
rising input costs, namely wood and chemicals used in the manufacturing process, as paper 
prices remained very stable throughout the period. Despite this decrease, the ability to 
produce paper sold at a premium and without recurring to distributors has made Portucel able 
to secure higher profit margins in its paper segment than its peers. 
The pulp standalone segment has been reducing its weight on Portucel’s profits (from 12% in 
2010 to 6% in 2011 and up again to 9% in 2013), largely a consequence of the increased 
integration of pulp output into paper production.  Besides, the profit margins in this segment 
shrank from 30% in 2010, when average sales prices plummeted in the second quarter of 2011. 
The profit margin went up again in 2012 and remained stable through 2013, yet far below 
2010 levels. This is a consequence of the integration of more pulp when the new mill started 
operation in late 2010. In terms of capacity, pulp mills increased their capacity slightly through 
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increased efficiency, not enough to compensate for the integration of pulp in the paper mill. 
Overall, Portucel managed to achieve greater profit margins than the industry average 
throughout the period. 
The forestry business presents a trend of shrinking margins – in 2013, the margin stood at 2% 
compared with 7% in 2010. This segment has a small weight in the firm’s overall profitability 
and it is geared towards a role of providing input for production rather than a profit center. 
This segment also faces constraints from the lack of raw material available in Portugal - the 
forest land available is not enough to fully supply Portucel’s needs. This leads to a deficit 
situation which has been compensated by importing wood, which yields higher costs due to 
expensive transportation (the unit cost of transporting wood is very high due to its 
weight/price ratio). 
Finally, the energy segment profit margin remained stable in the last three years, between 8% 
and 9%. The investments in co-generation biomass plants have been increasing revenues from 
this segment and profit margins have accompanied this trend.  
4.2.4. CAPEX 
 
FIGURE 31: CAPITAL EXPENDITURES. SOURCES: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Capital expenditures were €522 million in 2009, largely channeled to the Setubal mill which 
was under construction in the period. Since 2010, with the plant ready to operate, Portucel’s 
plants, which are its main fixed assets, didn’t need any further investment and the company 
hasn’t taken up on any new development projects throughout the period. With new, state-of-
the-art plants and absence of new fixed asset investments, capital expenditures remained low 
throughout the period (1.2% of revenues in 2013). 
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The company recently announced an expansion project in one of its pulp mills, amounting to 
€56 million. Besides this investment, the lack of raw material to expand production and the 
low capital investment required in the existing mills indicates that low CAPEX will be persistent 
in the foreseeable future.  
4.2.5. Net Working Capital 
Net working capital is calculated as the difference between the sum of the cash balance, the 
accounts receivable and total inventories minus accounts payable, all 31 of December figures.  
 
Portucel’s working capital structure remained stable between 2012 and 2013. The company 
accumulates large cash balances relative to revenues (22% and 34% in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively). In terms of payment schedules, clients pay their accounts outstanding in around 
45 days – figure which didn’t change in this two year period - while Portucel decreased the 
time it took to pay suppliers from 94 days in 2012 to 74 in 2013. In terms of the inventory 
cycle, the company generates sales from inventories which are stocked for an average of 80 
days. 
The net result of Portucel working capital structure is that it has positive working capital needs 
which increase with sales. Indeed, Portucel’s current assets are much larger than its current 
liabilities – especially because inputs are purchased and kept in the firm for almost three 
months before being converted into sales and because the large cash balances the firm 
accumulates. This creates an imbalance which originated positive working capital of €496 
million in 2012 and €727 million in 2013. The investment in working capital was thus close to 
€35 million in 2013. 
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4.2.6. Interest-bearing Liabilities 
 
FIGURE 32: TOTAL INTEREST-BEARING LIABILITIES. SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTS 
Interest-bearing liabilities have been stable, in absolute terms, throughout the 5 year period 
(see Figure 32). From €752 million in 2009, the minimum occurred in 2012 (€693 million) and 
the maximum was in 2010 and 2013 (€821 million and €831 million, respectively). The firm has 
allowed debt to vary little in absolute terms over the period, however, as a percentage of 
revenues, debt has shrank from 69% in 2009 to 54% in 2013.  
In terms of maturity, Portucel doesn’t show a clear trend or target ratio between short term 
and long term interest-bearing liabilities. Specifically, short-term debt has fluctuated between 
8% and 79% of long-term debt, in 2009 and 2013, respectively. This fluctuation is explained by 
in €, 2012
Net Working Capital
Cash & C. Equivalents
in €, 2013
Net Working Capital
Cash & C. Equivalents
524,293,683            
496,267,030            
726,978,782            
Total Inventory Accounts Payable
202,925,486            201,052,536            
Accounts Receivables
200,812,149            
Total Inventory
212,387,683            
188,359,334            
Accounts Receivables
329,368,449            
Accounts Payable
233,848,436            
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two key aspects: the first is that some large long-term debt issues matured in less than one 
year in 2009; the second is due to the extremely tight credit conditions Portuguese firms 
operated in since 2010, especially the corporate bond markets, which led many to finance 
themselves in with shorter-term maturities to avoid costly long-term financing, in 2011 and 
2012 mostly, thus the sudden increase of short-term debt against the plunge of long-term debt 
(35% drop from 2010 to 2012). 
5. Forecasts 
5.1. Pulp and Paper Index Prices Forecasts 
 
 
FIGURE 33: PAPER, PULP AND MSCI WORLD INDEX. SOURCE: BLOOMBERG 
Printing & Writing paper prices tend to be very stable over time (see graph XX). From 2009 to 
2014, on an indexed basis (price on the 4th of July 2014 = 100), the FOEX PIX A4 B Copy price 





























































































































































































A4 paper price index, BHKP pulp price index and MSCI World 
Index, indexed, July 2009 = 100 
A4 PAPER PRICE INDEX BHKP PULP PRICE INDEX MSCI WORLD INDEX
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compares with a MSCI EQUITY INDEX ranging from 100 to 183, over the same period. In light of 
this fact, it is expected that P&W paper prices will remain quite stable for the foreseeable 
future. 
Analysts’ consensus is on a stable outlook for paper prices as well. Espirito Santo Investment 
Bank foresees paper prices decreasing by half percentage point in 2014 and increasing 1% 
from 2015 onwards. This is based on historical prices as well as information regarding a slowly 
increasing supply, with new paper mills replacing existing ones which will be divested, and 
slowly increasing demand globally. 
For all of the abovementioned reasons, paper prices are here forecasted as the price of the 
previous year plus 70% the long term inflation forecasts for the European Union, after 2016 
the market where the bulk of its paper sales are generated (78% in 2012). This implies that 
paper prices grow at a rate of 1.3% a year, the long term inflation forecast published by the 
European Central Bank. As a benchmark, the FOEX PIX A4 B Copy index had a CAGR of 1.5% 
between April 2010 and April 2014.  
Pulp 
 
Contrarily to paper prices, where analysts are somewhat in agreement over the price trends, in 
the pulp industry forecasts vary widely.  
Pulp industry research firms highlight the main drivers of pulp prices over the next 2 to 3 years: 
 The large injection of new market pulp capacity due before the end of 2014 (e.g. 
Suzano’s Maranhão unit, fully operational in 2014, will add 1,500 thousand tons of 
pulp annually) 
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 Old pulp capacity being retired by means of companies divesting and shutting down 
inefficient mills 
 China pulp imports growth 
 Demand growth in the largest pulp consuming markets such as the US, Europe and key 
Asian economies 
 World macroeconomic data, specifically employment rate, industrial output, 
consumption data, and so forth 
 EUR/USD exchange rate 
Although most analysts agree that the above mentioned data will drive pulp prices in the 
foreseeable future, the net result of these variables lacks consensus, with forecasts ranging 
from a significant price hike in the next 2 years to a sharp downfall of prices over the same 
period.  
Without a consensus, one can choose the forecast to use by comparing past performance of 
the forecasts available. This is likely to yield a better forecast than an alternative method such 
as averaging the available forecasts to come up with a “consensus” forecast. Bright Market 
Insight was able to accurately forecast price directions 86% of the times – which is a great hit 
rate given historical pulp price volatility.  
BMI forecasts the FOEX BHKP pulp index reaching €700 in the short-term and staying high 
through 2014. By March 2015, the company sees the index gradually decreasing to a minimum 
of €500 at which point it would stabilize throughout 2016 and 2017. This forecasted fall in 
prices has to do primarily with the planned capacity to be added over 2014,  which will 
increase the quantity of pulp entering the market in the beginning of 2015, probably not 
immediately absorbed by the market, causing more aggressive pricing by the industry’s 
players. 
 The economic performance of emerging economies, especially that of China, is widely agreed 
to be one of the drivers of pulp prices in the foreseeable future. Indeed, much of the growth in 
pulp consumption is expected to come from emerging economies which are increasing its 
paper consumption and, without availability of eucalyptus forestlands to expand pulp 
production, therefore its pulp imports. Companies which have new pulp mills under 
development are counting on distributing the output from their new units to emerging 
markets where pulp demand is forecasted to grow at around 3% annually. In light of these, 
emerging markets paper products consumption historical upward growth trend must continue 
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through the next years or the industry will face excess capacity and the price cuts which follow 
such imbalances. This analysis focuses on emerging markets because the assumption that 
European and North American markets will, at best, remain stagnant. By looking at the recent 
historical data as well as the available forecasts, the assumption seems to be resilient. 
5.2. Portucel - Forecasts 
5.2.1. Energy revenues 
Integrated energy mills have been a priority investment for Portucel, which developed and 
now operates biomass cogeneration mills integrated in their pulp and paper mills. Among the 
drivers of their strategic move into internally produced, renewable energy from biomass, on 
can highlight the following: 
 The availability of the traditional energy sources at relatively stable prices is uncertain. 
As the paper industry is highly energy intensive, this risk is exacerbated. To  hedge 
against energy price fluctuations and lower its weight on production costs, firms are 
channelling CAPEX to these assets to accomplish an higher degree of energy self-
sufficiency 
 Renewable energy sources, including biomass energy, the type most industry players 
firms generate, are subsidized by the Portuguese government, seeking to both reduce 
the country’s carbon footprint and energy imports. This leads a lower investment  
required from corporations, as a part of capital expenditures  are financed by 
government funds while the government also subsidizes renewable energy by setting 
a fixed, above market price for the energy generated  
 The company has access to forestry sub products used in biomass mills, which have a 
negligible market value. In fact, the firm can expand its energy segment organically as 
it would be relatively easy to source additional quantities of forestry sub product from 
their own forest lands 
Revenues from the energy segment will be rising due to CAPEX being channelled to biomass 
production facilities integrated in the existing pulp and paper mills. Despite output increases, 
uncertainty remains with respect to the price at which Portucel can sell its energy generated. 
Currently, renewable energy generation is less subsidized than it was in the recent past and it 
is unknown whether subsidies will continue and at what terms. Despite this risk, revenues 
from this segment are here forecasted to grow at rate of 3% annually, similar to the CAGR in 
the 2009 to 2013 period. 
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5.2.2. Operational Costs  
 
Costs of consumed inventories 
These costs are expected to rise in the near term, from the current 42.5% of sales to 43% in 
2014 and 43.5% in 2015 and 2016. That year is forecasted to be the end of the upwards trend 
which started in 2010. Thus, 2017 costs of consumed inventories will revert back to 43% of 
sales values decreasing further to 42.5% in 2018, at which point are forecasted to remain 
unchanged, as a percentage of revenues. These forecasted increases over the next two years 
and subsequent decreases are explained by two key components of costs: 
 Portucel’s wood internal supply only accounts for 20% of total requirements. 
Furthermore, the domestic market cannot meet the balance nor will it meet in the 
future (there are regulatory constraints to eucalyptus plantation). So, the firm must 
procure this raw material internationally, mainly importing eucalyptus wood from 
Latin America, at uncertain and expensive prices. This structural issue is forecasted to 
continue to be costly throughout the future 
 Chemicals used in the paper and pulp production are also rising steadily and are 
expected to be rising in the foreseeable future 
In 2017, the trend will be reverted as the firm is able to secure a larger proportion of wood 
domestically and chemical prices enter a downward trend. 
Costs of materials and services consumed 
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Costs of material and services consumed can be decomposed by transportation costs, energy 
costs as well as a wide range of other consumed services and materials, the latter forecasted in 
an aggregated account as information is scarce and simplification does not compromise the 
analysis and forecasts of costs of materials and services consumed. Overall, this costs are 
forecasted to remain stable throughout the five year estimation period, as a percentage of 
revenues. However, it is important to point out that transportation and energy costs were 
estimated separately from other costs, as this two have a weight of two thirds of the total 
costs of materials and services consumed. 
Regarding energy costs, it is of note that the firm generates more revenues from biomass that 
it spends on its total energy costs. This is forecasted to be maintained as energy costs are 
forecasted to gradually decrease, as percentage of revenues, due to investments in improving 
the energy efficiency of their mills and their operations in general. Oil&Gas prices are here 
assumed to remain stable at 2013 levels. 
The firm forecasts transportation costs rises going forward from around 9% of revenues to 
10.5% of revenues as the firm sources wood from Latin America and diversifies its client base 
to geographic regions farther than Europe, where currently 95% of its sales are generated, as a 
percentage of revenues, as it imports raw materials from Latin America and exports to fast 
growing emerging markets in Asia and elsewhere. 
Salaries and employee costs 
Salaries and employee costs have been decreasing since 2009, as a percentage of revenue, and 
it is expected that this trend will continue at least until 2016. This is a consequence of the 
economic crisis that led Portugal’s unemployment levels to its all-time high and salaries to 
decrease both in real and nominal terms. Another driver of this trend is the subsidized 
employment that Portucel has adhered to – put simply, the firm has to pay a fraction of the 
worker’s salary. This is likely to continue until the economic hardship Portugal is facing is 
replaced with GDP growth and lower unemployment. While the matter is controversial, it is 
forecasted that 2015 will be a turning year, where salaries are again up and government 
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Portucel has finished its largest investment in fixed assets in 2009 when the new Setubal paper 
mill development was concluded. The firm went on to put its capital expenditures to an almost 
complete halt after that round of investment, similarly to what other firms in the industry 
usually do after a period of aggressive investment. Furthermore, the company’s assets are in 
the early stages of its useful life, thus capital expenditures required to update facilities and 
bring efficiency up to current benchmarks are minimal. Furthermore, firm managers and 
analysts alike agree that the firm has no organic growth opportunities, thus their growth 
model based on developing new mills cannot be replicated into the future. 
Forecasting CAPEX is thus based on understanding future developments which Portucel is 
expected to undertook, given that capital investments to improve assets in place will be 
residual. This has to do with the lack of raw material available domestically and the 
Mozambique development plan is in its inception stage and won’t require fixed asset 
investment in the foreseeable future. 
From the above, this thesis assumption regarding CAPEX needs is that they will be close to €40 
million in 2014 and €54 million in 2015, half the value of depreciations. From 2015 on, capital 
expenditures are forecasted to catch up with depreciations by 2018, reflecting higher costs 
updating assets in place and investments in energy fixed assets. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank also expects capital expenditures to be residual over the next 
five years. In their Portucel valuation assumptions, ESIB sees CAPEX at €50 million a year from 
2014 to 2016, half the figure for depreciations.  
5.2.4. Depreciations 
Depreciations for 2013 were around 3% of the book value of tangible assets excluding land. As 
assets in place won’t change, this ratio is adopted for the five year estimation period and also 
in perpetuity. With CAPEX lagging depreciation over the period, net property, plant and 
equipment shrinks by around 2.8% per year, on average. 
5.2.5. Working Capital 
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Working capital was estimated through average payment, receivables and inventory days. The 
average number of day’s receivables is given by the ratio between sales and accounts 
receivables. This ratio is forecasted to increase by 8 days throughout the period, which means 
that it is assumed that customers pay their invoices, on average, within 2 months, closer to the 
length it takes Portucel to pay its suppliers currently. The increasing trend is thus likely to end 
by 2018, when the firm moves closer to 2 months. Conversely, the average number of days 
Portucel takes to pay its suppliers is likely to follow an opposite trend, reaching 60 days by 
2018, from 68 days in 2013. Finally, day’s inventories are likely to decrease has the firm is 
increasingly efficient in managing the output of the new mill and processes become more 
standardized and, as a consequence, inventories are kept for shorter periods of time.  
Overall, working capital will remain fairly stable throughout the period, thus the investment 
will be relatively small compared with revenues, at around 1%. This is in agreement with the 
firm’s own estimations that their working capital needs will be residual in the foreseeable 
future.  
5.2.6. Debt  
In late 2013, in the aftermath of the extremely tight credit conditions the Portuguese public 
sector and corporations alike faced, the Portuguese corporate bond markets eased up and 
firms once again had access to long-term financing at reasonable cost. Portucel issued long-
term debt and retired two thirds of its short-term debt over the year. Assuming that access to 
credit will remain stable over the next 5 years, in this thesis it is forecasted that the company 
will keep its debt levels stable throughout the period both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of revenues (revenues will remain stable and, consequently, so will interest-
bearing liabilities). Thus, debt will stand at around €850 million throughout the period, or 54% 
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revenues. In terms of maturities, it is forecasted that the firm will adopt the average ratio of 
2012 and 2013 through the future (18% of total debt) from 2015 onwards, reflecting their goal 
of financing structural projects with long-term debt and using short-term debt conservatively.  
Average cost of debt is forecasted to gradually increase from the current 3% by 0.5% a year 
since 2015 to 2018, assuming that interest rates will rise in the European Union and elsewhere.  
5.2.7. Dividends 
The firm has been accumulating cash since its new paper mill is operating. In 2011, the firm 
had €134 million in cash in its balance sheet which compares with €524 million in 2013, thus 
multiplying by four its cash reserves in just two years. This has led net debt to be increasingly 
lower, as interest-bearing liabilities increased by only around €50 million in the period. With 
stable free cash flows which cannot be invested in expanding the business, at least not 
domestically as the firm used to in the past, the firm has started buying back shares – treasury 
shares went from €42 million in 2011 to €94 million in 2013 – and distributing nearly all its 
earnings in the form of dividends – the dividend pay-out ratio was 96% in 2013.  
In this thesis, it is assumed that the strategic goal of the company won’t be to expand 
overseas, whether through M&A or organically. As such, the firm won’t invest its earnings 
expanding its business neither it will need to bring down debt levels or invest substantial 
amounts in working capital or replacing assets in place. That will lead Portucel to generate 
substantial free cash flows which are forecasted to be completely distributed to shareholders, 
in the form of dividends. Furthermore, it is assumed that dividends will be higher than 
earnings from 2014 to 2017, as the firm distributes some of its cash accumulated over the last 
three years to investors. Dividends are assumed to be 150% of net income in 2014 through to 
2016, or €230 and €210 million, 125% in 2017 and 100% in 2018. 
5.3. Suzano - Forecasts 
5.3.1. Revenues  
Pulp 
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In 2014, pulp capacity will increase by 1,100 thousand tons, followed by another 400 thousand 
tons in 2015, as the result of the new plant starting operations. As firms set up production in 
new units, it is usual that the new units operate at a lower utilization rate in the first year. In 
this case, it is forecasted that the new mill will operate at half its capacity in 2014, meaning the 
total utilization rate will be 80%. After 2014, the firm will move to operate at full capacity 
(production equal to 98% of installed capacity), which is assumed to be sustained throughout 
the estimation period. The average discount over the index price is maintained in the 
foreseeable future, at 14.5%. All in all, pulp revenues will grow 11.8% a year from 2014 to 
2018. 
Paper 
Paper revenues are forecasted to be flat throughout the five year estimation period, with full 
operating capacity to be maintained and the discount price over the index to remain at 0.7%. 
As such, the CAGR for the 2013 to 2018 will be 0.3%. 
5.3.2. Costs 
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Costs of goods Sold 
As the firm’s pulp operations will operate at 80% of total capacity in 2014, as opposed to the 
current scenario in which the ratio reaches 99%, the increase in fixed costs arising from the 
new mill will have a larger weight in COGS, which will rise as a percentage of revenues. While 
COGS stood at 58% of revenues in 2013, they are forecasted to be 61% in 2014, thus lowering 
the gross profit margin by 3% p.p., to 39%. After 2014, COGS will initiate a downwards trend, 
to 60% in 2015, 58% in 2016 and finally 57% in 2017 and 2018, as a percentage of revenues. 
Sales, general and administrative expenses 
Sales and general and administrative expenses (G&A expenses) are forecasted to gradually 
decrease over the next five years, as a percentage of revenues. This assumption is supported 
by management’s efforts to rationalize costs in these two areas, namely through the cost 
cutting program already in place. It is also foreseeable that the weight of these costs in total 
costs goes down as the firm grows and fixed costs are diluted. Specifically, sales expenses can 
be diluted as the firm achieves a larger scale in quantities sold while general and 
administrative expenses’ weight can be reduced as the firm is able to manage the new 
industrial unit with some of its existing resources. 
5.3.3. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
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CAPEX is forecasted based on recent historical trend and analyst consensus provided by 
Bloomberg. Analyst consensus is available for 2014 and 2015 and these forecasts are used in 
this thesis. The numbers seem plausible: in 2014 CAPEX of €578 million will be directed 
towards ongoing investments in logistics, i.e. setting up the logistics to distribute the output of 
the new mill globally, energy and replacing and updating assets in place; in 2015, and onwards, 
the firm won’t be taking any new large development projects thus CAPEX will decrease to 
levels close to depreciations, being composed largely be updating existing assets and 
expanding integrated energy mills. 
5.3.4. Depreciations 
The firm uses the straight line depreciation method for its fixed assets excluding biological 
assets, which are not subject to depreciation. 
The assumption regarding depreciations is that the average useful life of fixed assets in place 
excluding biological assets will be maintained at 20 years, thus annual depreciations will equal 
approximately 5% of the book value of fixed assets throughout the period. Consequently, 
depreciations will amount to €329 million in 2014, and remaining stable throughout the 
estimation period. 
5.3.5. Working Capital  
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Investment in working capital will total €161 million in 2014 and another €83 million in 2015, 
as the firm’s revenues increase by 26% and 155, in 2014 and 2015, respectively, accompanied 
by a cost increase roughly the same magnitude. However, the increase in working capital is 
countered by an improvement in the working capital average days outstanding. Specifically, 
the average number of days of outstanding receivables is forecasted decrease, from 83 days in 
2013 to 75 in 2014 and to 73 in 2015. Indeed, the firm states in its annual report that it seeks 
to receive faster from clients to lower working capital investment needs. Suzano is also 
implementing measures to manage inventories more efficiently – the gains from these 
measures are forecasted to accrue during the estimation period, lowering the average number 
of days inventories are kept by 4 days throughout the period, from 69 days in 2013 to 65 days 
in 2018. Lastly, the number of days payables take to be liquidated is forecasted to remain 
stable at 80 days, similar to the 2013 figure. 
Incorporating the assumptions regarding receivables, payments and inventory average days 
into the working capital calculations yields the working capital investment needs throughout 
the estimation period. After a period of positive needs, from 2014 to 2015, during which the 
firm must allocate an extra €244 million to working capital, in 2016 and 2017 working capital 
needs will be negative at €78 million and €14 million, respectively, meaning that the firm will 
be able to reduce the cash allocated to working capital. After 2017, variations are forecasted 
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Suzano has outlined a strategy focused on using free cash flows to reduce its leverage, which 
management and analysts alike agree to be unsustainable given the volatility of the firm’s 
revenues and costs. As a consequence, excess cash will be distributed primarily to its creditors 
rather than to its debtors, i.e. shareholders. Despite the focus on deleveraging, mature firms 
such as Suzano do not usually forgo its dividend distribution altogether – the firm had negative 
net income in 2013 and it still paid dividends of €0.03 per share. In light of this fact, it is 
forecasted that the firm will adopt a dividend pay-out ratio of 50% of net income during the 
estimation period as well as in perpetuity. This will amount to €0.055 a share in 2014, rising as 
net income increases, reaching €0.15 a share in 2018. 
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The Maranhao project was the largest project to ever be undertaken by Suzano and also one 
of the largest projects to be developed in the pulp and paper industry lately. The bulk of the 
investment occurred between 2010 and 2013, which led the firm to increase its debt by over 
€1.5 billion, or 10 p.p. as a proportion of total assets.  
The capital expenditures needs put leverage ratios above the industry average – whether one 
looks at Debt to EBITDA, Debt to total Assets or EBITDA to interest, the firm seems 
overleveraged if compared with a group of industry peers. Taking ratio of debt to total assets 
into consideration, Suzano has the largest proportion of interest-bearing liabilities, 11 p.p. 
above the peer group average. The interest coverage ratio, given by EBITDA divided by 
interest, also leads to the conclusion that Suzano is more leveraged than the industry average. 
While the firm’s EBITDA is slightly above double the amount of interest it pays, the industry’s 
average is EBITDA 11 times the value of interest.  
Management is concerned with the highly leveraged capital structure the firm has adopted 
over the last years. Believing that the current capital structure threatens the sustainability of 
the firm and leaves it exposed to financial distress, reducing leverage is the top priority of the 
firm over the next years. It is assumed that the goal of the firm is to bring debt down, closer to 
the peer group average of 36% of total assets, from the current 47%. That will occur from 2015 
onwards, where it is forecasted that cash-flows to service debt will be enough to lower debt to 
41% of total assets by 2018. In absolute terms, it is assumed that the firm will maintain a cash 
balance close to €1 billion, as it did historically. Over that balance, all cash after investments 
and dividend distributions will be used to bring down debt levels, meaning that, from 2014 to 
2018, the firm lowers debt by €561 million, from the 2013 level of €3.9 billion to €3.4 billion.  
6. Rationale for the proposed transaction 
The proposed merger, between Portucel and Suzano Papel e Celulose, has the potential to 
enhance the competitive strengths of both companies while minimizing their weaknesses. The 
Name Debt to EBITDA Debt to Assets EBITDA to Interest 
SUZANO PAPEL E CELULOSE 6,9x 47% 2,2x
KLABIN SA 5,2x 47% 3,8x
EMPRESAS CMPC SA 4,7x 28% 4,8x
LEE & MAN PAPER MANUFACT. 3,8x 35% 9,8x
PORTUCEL SA 2,5x 29% 13,4x
GUANGDONG GUANHAO HIGH-TEC 9,0x 37% 3,1x
UPM-KYMMENE OYJ 4,0x 28% 7,0x
KAPSTONE PAPER AND PACKAGING 3,8x 45% 12,5x
SCHWEITZER-MAUDUIT INTL INC 2,4x 31% 55,9x
METSA BOARD OYJ 3,9x 33% 2,8x
Average 4,6x 36% 11,5x
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main propositions which constitute the strategic fit of this deal are highlighted below. These 
are based on the strategic assessment that both companies would benefit from selling its 
products in each other markets and that cooperation in different areas of their value chains 
can reduce costs and secure their competitive advantages.   
Gain access to new markets 
Suzano Papel and Celulose has a strong, consolidated presence in South America, especially in 
Brazil, and a rising presence in Asia, the world’s regions where printing and writing paper 
demand growth is currently higher and is forecasted to be higher in the next five years, when 
compared to the rest of the world. Furthermore, while economies in these regions expand and 
living standards rise, the demand for premium products is expected to rise. Portucel, having 
some of the world’s most valued premium brands, has the potential to capitalize on this trend 
and reap profits from selling its distinctive paper brands in markets such as China and Brazil, 
among others. The already established distribution channels of the Brazilian company in these 
regions will facilitate the entry and expansion of Portucel’s paper products. Besides, the 
Portuguese company products can complement the product portfolio of Suzano, thus reaping 
synergies from cross-selling initiatives.  
On the other hand, Suzano can benefit from access to the consolidated European pulp and 
paper market through cooperation with Portucel. The Portuguese company has a long track 
record and a solid position in the European market but lacks size and output to capture a 
higher market share. Suzano can use Portucel’s expertise and market access to increase their 
combined market share in Europe. 
 
 
Portucel can secure stability in the value chain 
Suzano 2024 Plan highlights their vision and competitive advantages which management 
believes will make the company one of the largest and most efficient forestry based companies 
CAGR demand
2009 - 2013 2014e - 2019e
North America -3.8% -2.8%
Western Europe -3.0% -2.3%
Eastern Europe 3.1% 2.0%
Asia 3.3% 2.2%
Latin America 2.3% 1.1%
Others 2.2% 1.7%
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in the world. Accordingly to the Plan, its core strategic focus will be on expanding installed 
capacity of market pulp – as well as keeping a strong position in the paper segment and invest 
in in-house renewable energy production. 
Contrary to Suzano, which has a massive forest base to expand organically through greenfield 
investments, Portucel has very limited access to eucalyptus wood to expand its pulp plants. It 
would thus be strategically sound for both companies to combine the highly productive 
eucalyptus forests of Suzano and the capability of Portucel to transform eucalyptus wood into 
paper products efficiently which are sold at premium pricing. To accomplish this, the two 
companies operations could be merged to accommodate their strengths – Portucel would 
secure a stable, reliable and relatively inexpensive raw material supply while Suzano would 
secure a distribution channel for its production.  
By integrating their business the combined entity would benefit from less exposure to highly 
volatile pulp prices. In fact, Suzano’s revenues are highly exposed to price movements of this 
typically volatile commodity. Conversely, Portucel cannot expand its paper production without 
becoming exposed to pulp prices – which is in fact the main reason why it chooses not to 
expand its paper plants. 
Joint development of industrial facilities in Brazil 
Brazil’s eucalyptus forests yield 41 m3 of hardwood per hectare per year, being the world’s 
most productive forests due to excellent soil and climate conditions which provide 
substantially shorter harvesting cycles than most other countries and thus more wood per 
hectare. Contrastingly, Portugal has much less productive eucalyptus forests: on average, on 
hectare of planted land yields 12 m3 of wood per year. (See figure XX) 
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Having the most productive forests on earth, Brazilian forest based companies, like Suzano 
Papel e Celulose, reap the benefits from this competitive advantage and are thus able to 
produce cheaper pulp than most other countries, namely Portugal. Currently, it costs $350 to 
produce one ton of pulp in Brazil while it costs $448 to produce the same amount of pulp in 
Portugal (and Spain). China and the US, the world’s two largest paper consumers, need $578 
and $523 to produce one ton of pulp, respectively. It is thus clear that Brazil has a comparative 
advantage not only to Portugal but also to most European, North American and Asian 
countries, where a large portion of the world’s pulp demand is concentrated.  
In light of these facts and adding to it the strategic goal of Portucel to expand its industrial 
facilities, the company could partner with Suzano to develop integrated pulp and paper mills 
near the latter’s massive forestlands, in line with the integrated business model that Portucel 
states as its core competitive advantage.  
For Suzano Papel e Celulose, developing integrated production facilities with its Portuguese 
peer would not only provide the necessary financing for a typically large and long investment 
but would also allow the firm to access the expertise of Portucel in building the world’s most 
efficient mills (one of Portucel’s mills is to date the most efficient globally). 
Last but perhaps most importantly, Portucel would be able to diversify their production base. 
According to the company’s Chairman, the company must acknowledge that it is present in 
118 countries while producing exclusively in one. Furthermore, he says that the American 
continent would be the obvious target to develop a new production unit. Indeed, the long-
term in the paper industry is to move closer to customers so as to avoid rising transportation 
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Source: Hawkins Wright (April 2014) 
Concentrated ownership  
Portucel and Suzano are both controlled by a holding which owns more than 50% of outstanding shares. 
In order to engage in negotiations and ultimately agree on the terms of the merger, the two holdings 
can cooperate in a more efficient fashion than it would take in a company with only minor shareholders. 
In this context of an entity controlling each of the companies, a deal could be negotiated between the 
two parties as it is usual for them to control key decisions of their firms. 
7. Standalone Valuation 























Cash Costs in pulp production, 
US$/ton, 2014 
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The consolidated income statement of Portucel was decomposed for the years in the 
estimation period, between 2014 and 2018. Incorporating the assumptions discussed in the 
forecasts section, the resulting pro-forma income statement shows that the firm will be 
profitable throughout the period, although net profit margin will decrease from 14% in 2013, 
to 10% thereof, consequence of the operational costs growing faster than revenues and the 
increase of the corporate tax rate, as the subsidized tax rate was due to Portucel’s large 
investments in recent years. The subsidized rate is assumed to be extinct in 2014, and the firm 
will bear the current tax rate, which the government said to be lowering over 2015 and 2016. 
The earnings per common share will amount to €0.214 in 2014, as opposed to the 2013’s value 
of €0.292. With the lack of available information, it is assumed that provisions will be null 
throughout the estimation period. The financial results will become more negative, as the firm 
distributes some of its cash – thus stops generate income – and the debt outstanding as well as 
the average interest rate increase. Despite the increase, an interest coverage ratio – which is 
the proportion of EBITDA to net financial results - will be twelve at its lowest in 2018, from the 
current value of EBITDA being twenty-five times the value of net financial results.  
Income Statement 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Revenues 1,551,857€   1,584,021€   1,563,247€   1,567,513€   1,595,765€   1,626,097€   
Costs
Consumed and sold inventories 659,833€      681,429€      680,308€      682,165€      686,481€      691,091€      
Costs of materials and services consumed 415,261€      424,446€      432,948€      424,725€      421,210€      429,216€      
Salaries and employee costs 114,248€      114,283€      111,656€      114,200€      119,746€      122,023€      
Other operational costs 12,015€        12,015€        12,015€        12,015€        12,015€        12,015€        
EBITDA 350,500€      351,848€      326,318€      334,407€      356,312€      371,752€      
Depreciations, Amortizations and imparity losses 102,821€      114,401€      113,323€      112,705€      112,569€      112,958€      
Provisions 13,964€        -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
EBIT 233,715€      237,446€      212,995€      221,703€      243,744€      258,794€      
Net Financial Results 14,148€        13,597€        17,450€        21,729€        26,609€        31,695€        
Earnings before taxes 219,567€      223,849€      195,545€      199,974€      217,135€      227,099€      
Taxes 9,520€         69,841€        55,144€        50,393€        54,718€        57,229€        
tax rate 31% 28% 25% 25% 25%
After-Tax Earnings 210,047€      154,008€      140,401€      149,580€      162,417€      169,870€      
Non-controlling interest 5€                -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
Net Profit 210,042€      154,008€      140,401€      149,580€      162,417€      169,870€      
Net Profit Margin 14% 10% 9% 10% 10% 10%
Earnings per share 0.292€         0.214€         0.195€         0.208€         0.226€         0.236€         
Number of shares 718,877      718,877      718,877      718,877      718,877      718,877      
Key Ratios 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
EBITDA Margin 23% 22% 21% 21% 22% 23%
EBIT Margin 15% 15% 14% 14% 15% 16%
EBITDA/Net Interest 25x 26x 19x 15x 13x 12x
ROE 14% 11% 10% 11% 12% 13%
Dividend Payout Ratio 96% 135% 135% 125% 115% 100%
Dividends per share 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.24
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The pro-forma Balance Sheet and Cash-Flow statement were also composed for the years 
composing the estimation period (see appendix 1). 




Suzano’s pro-forma consolidated income statements are the result of the assumptions 
discussed in the forecasts section. The firm presented losses for 2013, due primarily to interest 
payments and non-operating losses which are not recurrent. The EBIT was positive, with a 
margin of 17%, in 2013, which will decreased by 1 p.p. in 2014 and then increase gradually to 
22% in 2017 and 2018. The bottom line will also increase, both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of revenues, from 5% in 2014 to 11% in 2018, matching Portucel’s net profit 
margins. This is a consequence of a larger EBITDA margin after 2016, a decrease of the weight 
of interest payments and also revenues growth. The effective tax rate is forecasted to match 
Income Statement 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Revenues 1,994,255€   2,512,650€      2,886,998€  2,754,769€  2,802,311€  2,867,800€  
Cost of Goods Sold 1,157,210€   1,532,716€      1,732,199€  1,597,766€  1,597,318€  1,634,646€  
Gross Profit 837,046€     979,933€         1,154,799€  1,157,003€  1,204,994€  1,233,154€  
Sales Expenses 87,991€       103,019€         112,593€     101,926€     100,883€     100,373€     
G&A Expenses 132,161€     158,297€         176,107€     165,286€     168,139€     172,068€     
Other Operating Expenses 43,627€       50,253€           57,740€       55,095€       56,046€       57,356€       
Other Operating Revenue 80,522€       62,816€           72,175€       68,869€       70,058€       71,695€       
EBITDA 653,788€     731,181€         880,534€     903,564€     949,984€     975,052€     
Depreciation and Amortization 311,785€     329,435€         334,102€     333,881€     333,892€     334,224€     
EBIT 342,004€     401,746€         546,432€     569,684€     616,092€     640,828€     
interest 238,933€     244,397€         247,556€     227,259€     211,996€     205,019€     
Net non-operating losses 201,221€     -€                -€            -€            -€            -€            
Earnings before taxes 98,150-€       157,350€         298,877€     342,425€     404,096€     435,809€     
Taxes 20,864-€       39,337€           74,719€       85,606€       101,024€     108,952€     
effective tax rate 21% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
After-Tax Earnings 77,286-€       118,012€         224,157€     256,819€     303,072€     326,857€     
Net Profit 77,286-€       118,012€         224,157€     256,819€     303,072€     326,857€     
Net Profit Margin -4% 5% 8% 9% 11% 11%
Earnings per share 0.071-€         0.109€             0.207€        0.237€        0.279€        0.301€        
Number of shares 1,084,900   1,084,900      1,084,900  1,084,900  1,084,900  1,084,900  
Key Ratios 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
EBITDA Margin 33% 29% 31% 33% 34% 34%
EBIT Margin 17% 16% 19% 21% 22% 22%
Net Debt/EBITDA 4x 4.3x 3.6x 3.2x 2.8x 2.6x
EBITDA/Interest 3x 3.0x 3.6x 4.0x 4.5x 4.8x
ROE -2% 4% 6% 7% 8% 8%
Payout ratio 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Dividends per share 0.03                0.054€                  0.103€         0.118€         0.140€         0.151€         
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Brazil’s corporate tax rate of 25% (KMPG, 2013). Earnings per share will grow throughout the 
estimation period, reaching €0.31 in 2018, from €.109 in 2014.  
The interest coverage ratio, which is lower than the peer group average and a ratio which 
management seeks to increase, stood at EBITDA being three times the value of interest in 
2013. This ratio will improve throughout the estimation period, peaking at 4.8 times in 2018. 
The pro-forma Balance Sheet and Cash-Flow statement were also composed for the years 
composing the estimation period (see appendix 2). 
7.2. Cost of capital 
Risk free Rate 
The risk free rate used in both companies cost of capital calculation is the yield of a ten year US 
government note. The reasons behind this choice have been discussed in the literature review. 
The average yield on these bonds was 2.34% in 2013, which compares with an average of 3.5% 
between 2004 and 2013. The choice falls on the latter: bond yields have been at their historical 
lowest since the financial crisis, as part of the economic stimulus packages adopted by 
governments and central banks around the world. As current yields are unlikely to be 
sustained throughout the future, the average yield to be used as an input will be the longer 
average. 
 
Market Risk Premium 
The market risk premium is different in Brazil and Portugal, according to a 2013 survey 














US 10 year note yield, 2004 to 2013
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used in this thesis will be the survey average result, which is 6.1% in Portugal, to be used for 
Portucel’s cost of capital, and 6.5% in Brazil, to be used for Suzano’s cost of capital estimation. 
Beta 
To calculate the beta to input into the cost of capital, the Hamada (1972) formula is used.  
 
The calculations are performed based on a peer group of paper industry firms, chosen taking 
into account its growth and market capitalization (calculations in appendix 4). Estimating the 
beta through linear regression was also performed, although the results are not significant and 
would skew results downwards artificially. 
The market-capitalization weighted peer group unlevered beta is 0.6, which gives a levered 
beta, given an effective tax rate of 25% and a peer group Net Debt to Market Capitalization 
ratio of 37.4%, of 1.15. 
Cost of capital – Levered cost of equity and WACC 
Suzano Papel e Celulose cost of equity and WACC 
 
The estimated levered cost of equity for Suzano is 11%, calculated using CAPM. Its after-tax 
cost of debt is assumed to be 4.5%, which is the year end 2013 average yield on the firm’s debt 
SUZANO PAPEL E CELULOSE - Cost of Equity
Risk Free Rate 3.5%   
Equity Market Risk Premium 6.5%   
Equity Beta (Relevered) 1.15
Average Debt/Capitalization (Market) 37.4%   
Effective Marginal Tax Rate 25.0%   
Adjusted Equity Market Risk Premium 7.5%   
Levered Cost of Equity 11.0%   
Cost of Debt
Cost of Debt (Pretax) 6.0%   
Cost of Debt (Aftertax) 4.5%   
Nominal WACC 8.6%   
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net of its effective tax rate of 25%. The nominal weighted average cost of capital results in 
8.6%, based on the peer group’s debt to market value of equity ratios.  
Portucel cost of equity and WACC 
 
The cost of capital and weighted average cost of capital estimation results are shown. The cost 
of capital, calculated through CAPM, is 10.6% while the weighted average cost of capital, 
assuming a cost of debt after tax of 2.9% and an effective tax rate of 25%, is 7.54%. 
7.3. Valuations Models 
7.3.1. Portucel 
7.3.1.1. Discounted Cash-Flows 
 
 
PORTUCEL - Cost of Equity
Risk Free Rate 3.5%   
Equity Market Risk Premium 6.1%   
Equity Beta (Relevered) 1.16
Average Debt/Capitalization (Market) 37.4%   
Effective Marginal Tax Rate 25.0%   
Adjusted Equity Market Risk Premium 7.1%   
Levered Cost of Equity 10.6%   
Cost of Debt
Cost of Debt (Pretax) 3.8%   
Cost of Debt (Aftertax) 2.9%   
Nominal WACC 7.5%   
€ '000 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
NOPAT € 163,363       152,931       165,834       182,320       193,578       
Capex € 39,601         54,714         70,538         87,767         105,696       
Change in Working Capital 14,304         5,720           13,491         4,257           4,571           
D&A € 114,401       113,323       112,705       112,569       112,958       
€ 223,860       205,820       194,509       202,865       196,269       
Growth (%) - -8.06% -5.50% 4.30% -3.25%
Terminal Value € 3,016,527    




- Debt 831,335        
Equity Value 2,624,911     
# Shares 718,877        
Value per share 3.65                
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The discounted cash-flow valuation starts with computing the value of EBIT after taxes, known 
as net operating profit less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT). Non-cash items, meaning depreciation 
and amortization, is then added back to NOPLAT, as well as two other items from the cash-
flow statement, working capital variation and capital expenditures. Cash-flows from financing 
activities are not added as capital structure decisions are incorporated in the discount rate 
WACC. It is assumed that the firm’s operations and its cash-flows will stabilize after 2018, at 
which point a terminal value was calculated. This leads to the unlevered free cash-flows to the 
firm and also the terminal value, obtained through the following formula: 
 
The terminal growth rate is assumed to be 1%, in line with the inflation estimates for Portugal 
and the forecasted long-term growth rate of the industry. 
Discounting these cash-flows at the WACC rate of 7.5% leads to an enterprise value of €3.456 
billion, distributed by €2.931 billion from operations and €524.3 million in cash, assumed to be 
entirely excess cash. By subtracting debt outstanding, which amounted to €831.3 million in 
2013, the equity value is €2.625 billion or €3.65 per common share. As a benchmark, Espirito 
Santo Investment Bank valued Portucel at €3.8 per share, or €2.731 billion, in a February 2014 
equity research report. Portucel shares closed their trading day on the 31st December 2013 at 
€2.91, implying a market undervaluation of 20%. However, the Investment Bank valuation of 
€3.8 per share and a buy recommendation implies that analysts are confident in an 
appreciation of shares in the future. 
7.3.1.2. Dividend Discount Model 
 
  
As the firm has a history of paying regular dividends, and it is assumed that it will continue 
paying dividends in the foreseeable future, the dividend discount model was used to assess 
€ '000 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
€ 0.29     0.21     0.20     0.21     0.23     0.24     
€ 0.28     0.29     0.26     0.26     0.26     0.24     
Terminal Value 2.46     




Value per share 3.21
# Shares 718,877     
Equity Value 2,304,023    
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the value of the firm’s equity. The choice fell for this method to better capture the effect on 
value of the firm paying dividends larger than earnings per share from 2014 to 2017, which 
was assumed to be the use for the firm’s growing cash balances.  
This model is applied by discounting dividends per share at the cost of levered equity and the 
terminal value growth rate is assumed to be equal than the used in the discounted cash-flows 
valuation, at 1%. This yields a result of €3.21 per share, decomposed by €2.48 from the present 
value of dividends per share and €0.73 from the cash balance, once again assumed to be 
entirely excess cash. This result is 12% lower than the value of obtained by the DCF valuation. 
As it was already mentioned, Portucel shares closed at €2.91 on December 31st, which in this 
case represents a 9% market undervaluation. 
7.3.1.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Firms in the paper and pulp industry are price takers, although paper prices are subject to a 
certain degree of differentiation, thus average paper prices tend to be more resilient to index 
paper price changes. As a consequence, Portucel’s revenues are exposed to the evolution of 
pulp and price indexes, making a sensitivity analysis relating revenues with Enterprise Value of 
paramount importance. Given the weight of fixed costs in the total cost structure of the 
company, a change in revenues leads to a higher change in free cash-flows to the firm, 
assuming everything else constant (ceteris paribus approach). As 1% change in annual 
revenues leads to a 1.16% change in EV. Although the change is higher in Suzano, which has a 
higher weight of fixed costs in its cost structure, it can be concluded that the assumptions 




Change in Revenues -3% -1% 0% 1% 3%
EV 3,336,294   3,416,262   3,456,246   3,496,230   3,576,197   
Change in EV (%) -3.47% -1.16% 0.00% 1.16% 3.47%
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
6.5% 3,581,814  3,765,472  3,982,521  4,242,981  4,561,321  
7.0% 3,365,859  3,519,636  3,699,043  3,911,069  4,165,500  
7.5% 3,176,412  3,306,344  3,456,246  3,631,104  3,837,717  
8.0% 3,014,842  3,126,157  3,253,373  3,400,161  3,571,415  





Terminal Value Growth Rate
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Assessing the impact of the cost of capital and terminal growth rate in the value of the firm 
must be included in any valuation, as these two variables vary depending on the assumptions 
taken and the methodology followed for its estimation. It is important to acknowledge that 
WACC and perpetuity growth rate also depend on macroeconomic and market inputs which 
change throughout time. Furthermore, they typically account for a great of value estimated 
and even a slight change translates into a great difference in EV. The analysis undertook shows 
the base case scenario with WACC at 7.5% and perpetuity growth rate at 1% and 0.5% changes 
to both. A WACC of 6.5%, with everything else constant, yields an EV of €3.982 billion, or €526 
million more than the base case; if WACC were to be half percent higher, the firm would be 
worth €202 million less. In terms of terminal growth rate, a figure of 2% instead of 1% would 
translate into an EV of €3.837 billion, €381 million more than the base case scenario.  
7.3.2. Suzano Papel e Celulose 
7.3.2.1. Discounted Cash-Flows 
 
 
The discounted cash-flow valuation was also used to value Suzano. The methodology followed 
was the same used to value Portucel: Capital expenditures and working capital variations 
forecasted until 2018, year which it is assumed the firm’s operations will stabilize, and 
deducted from NOPLAT. Depreciations and amortizations were added back, as these are the 
operational non-cash costs, needed to be excluded to arrive at the unlevered free cash-flows 
to the firm. The growth rate for the terminal value was set at 1%, which is the long-term 
forecast growth for the pulp and paper industry globally.  
€ '000 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
NOPAT € 301,310     409,824     427,263     462,069     480,621     
Capex € 577,909     375,310     275,477     280,231     286,780     
Change in Working Capital 161,958     82,711      78,728 -     13,993 -     3,014        
D&A € 329,435     334,102     333,881     333,892     334,224     
€ 109,123 -    285,905     564,395     529,722     525,051     
Terminal Value € 6,906,547  




- Debt 3,953,011  
Equity Value 3,062,125  
# Shares 1,084,900  
Value per share in € 2.82          
Value per share in R$ 8.06          
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The resulting enterprise value is €7.015 billion, which is decomposed by €5.882 billion value 
from the firm’s cash-flows discounted at the WACC rate of 8.6% and €1.132 billion 
corresponding to the cash balance in 2013, assumed to be entirely composed of excess cash. 
By subtracting interest-bearing liabilities of €3.953 billion, the firm’s equity value is €3.062 
billion, corresponding to €2.82 per share or R$ 8.06, at the December 2013 euro real exchange 
rate. Suzano’s shares closed at R$ 9.24 in the last trading day of the year 2013, implying a 
market overvaluation of 15% in relation to the value estimated through the DCF valuation.  
HSBC equity research issued an equity report in the beginning of 2014 which included a 
valuation of Suzano Papel e Celulose. The investment bank applied exactly the same beta 
considered in this thesis, a larger equity premium, at 8% and a terminal growth rate of 3%. The 
equity value per share calculated by the financial institution was R$ 8.2, exactly the same value 




As the firm will undertake a process of reducing leverage, from the current levels well above 
the industry to converge with the industry’s debt to equity ratio, the APV method is chosen to 
value the firm. This choice is justified by the absence of a stable capital structure and to better 
assess the separation between the value created by Suzano’s operations and by its leverage. 
The unlevered cost of equity for Suzano is 9.4% and the cost of debt, before taxes, is 6%. 
Consequently, the firm’s enterprise value unlevered is calculated with the same cash-flows 
used in the DCF valuation, but discounted at the unlevered cost of capital, yielding an 
2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
€ 318,112 - 109,123 - 285,905  564,395  529,722  525,051.12     
Terminal Value € 6,252,347       
€ 99,749 -  238,895  431,081  369,842  4,325,364.75  
Unlevered FCF
Discounted FCFF
Enterprise Value Unlevered 6,398,089
PV(ITS) 729,561       
PV(Bankrupcy costs) 57,021         
Enterprise Value Levered 7,070,629
- Debt 3,953,011    
Equity Value 3,117,618    
# Shares 1,084,900    
Value per share in € 2.87            
Value per share in R$ 8.21            
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unlevered enterprise value of €6.398 billion. This is decomposed by €5.265 billion of value 
arising from the cash-flows and €1.1 billion cash balance.   
 
The present value of the interest tax shields must be added to the firm’s unlevered enterprise 
value. The tax rate used in computing the interest tax shields is 25% and the appropriate 
discount rate to use is the cost of debt, which is 6% (see literature review – APV).  The terminal 
value of interest tax shields was calculated by subtracting the unlevered terminal value to the 
levered terminal value (reference needed). Having all the inputs necessary, the present value 
of interest tax shields is equal to €730 million. This represents around 15% of the value of the 
firm unlevered, which seems plausible given the large debt outstanding in 2013 and which only 
starts a downwards trend from 2016.  
The bankruptcy costs in case the firm is liquidated are estimated to be 20% (see literature 
review – Bankruptcy costs). Furthermore, the probability of default, estimated through 
Suzano’s BB credit rating, is 4% Damodaran (2006). This yields costs of financial distress of €57 
million.  
The levered enterprise value is calculated by adding the present value of tax shields and 
subtracting the costs of financial distress to the unlevered enterprise value. The value 
calculated was €7 billion, which is similar to the value achieved in the DCF valuation (2% more). 
By subtracting the value of debt outstanding in the end of 201, the equity value is equal to 
€3.117 billion, or €2.87 per share, or R$ 8.21. 
7.3.2.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In an equity research note from 2014, HSBC Global Research states that the accuracy of a 
valuation of Suzano Papel e Celulose is very dependent on pulp prices, which have a large 
effect on revenues and thus on cash-flows to the firm. As the firm has a high proportion of 
fixed costs relative to total costs, a decrease in revenues leads to a higher decrease in 
2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
€ 238,933  244,397   247,556          227,259   211,996  205,019  
€ 59,733   61,099    61,889            56,815     52,999    51,255    
€ 59,733   57,641    55,081            47,703     41,980    38,301    




Change in Revenues -3% -1% 0% 1% 3%
EV 6,673,042  6,901,105  7,015,136  7,129,167  7,357,230  
Change in EV (%) -4.88% -1.63% 0.00% 1.63% 4.88%
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Enterprise Value, in percentage terms. This excludes the potential financial effects arising from 
a lower EBITDA as a consequence of a revenue drop; indeed, for a highly leverage firm such as 
Suzano, with an interest coverage ratio at 3x in 2013, far below its peer group average. The 
potential problems from a lower interest coverage ratio are the worsening of credit terms, a 
larger probability of financial distress and the potential violation of debt covenants.  
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the change in enterprise value given a 
percentage increase/decrease in total revenues. For example, a 1% decrease in enterprise 
value leads to a 1.63% decrease in enterprise value. On the other hand, if annual revenues 
were to be 1% above the forecasted base case scenario, enterprise value would go up by 
1.63%. A 3% increase/decrease in annual revenues has an impact of 4.88% in enterprise value. 
 
Another sensitivity analysis performed relates two estimated variables with enterprise value, 
weighted average cost of capital and the growth rate of terminal value. It is customary to 
include this analysis in any equity valuation, as these variables depend on the methodology 
used and the judgment of the user. Besides, WACC and terminal value have a great impact on 
enterprise value – if, for instance, a growth in perpetuity of 2% was used, instead of 1%, the 
firm would be worth €700 million more and its share price would be higher than its 31st 
December market value of R$ 9.24 per share. Conversely, a change in WACC also as a deep 
impact in EV – if a WACC 1% lower was used, the firm would be worth an extra €1.1 billion, 
assuming everything else constant. 
8. Recent comparable M&A deals 
The paper industry had several recent M&A deals involving both private and publicly-traded 
firms. I have chosen two examples to analyse more deeply as they are comparable to the 
proposed merger in a number of ways, including: 
- The merging entities firms operate either in Brazil or Europe, or both; 
-  The M&A deal combined two firms operating in the same paper and pulp segments, 
as it is the case of Portucel and Suzano, which generate most of their paper sales from 
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
7.5% 7,371,635  7,719,948  8,121,848  8,590,731  9,144,866  
8.0% 6,938,233  7,236,017  7,576,342  7,969,024  8,427,154  
8.6% 6,483,693  6,733,016  7,015,136  7,336,978  7,707,568  
9.0% 6,217,151  6,440,189  6,691,106  6,975,478  7,300,476  
9.5% 5,914,120  6,109,165  6,327,157  6,572,397  6,850,336  
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printing & writing paper and are integrated pulp producers which also produce 
eucalyptus market pulp; 
- The comparable mergers combine firms which sell their products abroad; 
- Lastly, the M&A deals chosen involved firms with comparable sizes to Portucel and 
Suzano. 
The first deal to be analysed is the 2011 merger of the Finland-based pulp and paper producer 
UPM and Myllylokoski Corporation, a paper producer based in Germany and Finland. 
Afterwards, the 2009 merger of the Brazilian companies Aracruz and VCP is looked upon. The 
two companies formed Fibria, the world’s largest eucalyptus pulp producer, with 30% global 
market share.  
UPM and Myllylokoski Corporation merger 
”UPM has been very determined in implementing its long term strategy of being the cost leader 
in the European paper industry and the global leader in magazine papers. Consolidation and 
restructuring are the best way to make fundamental improvements in terms of cost efficiency 
and to create value in the paper business. Our position as a frontrunner in the industry enables 
us to make a step change in the profitability of our Paper Business”, UPM’s President and 
CEO Jussi Pesonen, 2011 
The statement of UPM’s President and CEO at the time of the acquisition of Myllylokoski 
summarizes the rationale for the takeover that was completed in 2011. UPM is a paper 
producer, operating primarily in the coated paper segment and producing pulp in several 
plants located in Europe and Latin America. Myllylokoski is a paper producer, which coated 
paper also represents the bulk of its operations. The company exported 95% of its production 
to Asia, Europe and the America. The firm was privately held at the time of the merger. 
The merger was done through a cash and stock acquisition of Myllylokoski, being that UPM 
financed the acquisition with €800 million of bank debt and a €5 million share issue, with a 
market value of €60 million prior to the merger. This has led UPM to control the merged 
entity.  
The rationale for the transaction was to achieve cost efficiencies and boost the paper business 
profitability. Specifically, UPM highlighted the key sources of value which supported the deal: 
- Consolidate the operations and the uncoated paper sales segment. Together, the firms 
would initially have a market share of 29% in the European publication paper; 
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- Improve UPM’s presence in some European paper markets where Myllylokoski had a 
stronger presence; 
- Achieve cost efficiencies in the merged entity value chain; 
- Improve distribution and logistics processes and the flexibility to serve new markets; 
- Broaden UPM’s product portfolio in the coated paper segment and target emerging 
markets with the resulting product portfolio 
Through these sources of value, and the expectation that some financial synergies would also 
emerge, in the form of better credit terms, it was estimated that the merger would yield a 
one-off gain of approximately €300 million after the merger as well as €100 million in synergies 
per year, starting in 2012. 
To realize the synergies, UPM estimated that integration costs would amount to €100 million 
to €150 million. 
Aracruz and VCP merger: the creation of Fibria 
In 2009, Fibria was created as the combination of VCP, the pulp and paper firm belonging to 
the Brazilian conglomerate Votorantim, and Aracruz, a Brazilian-based, publicly-traded, pulp 
and paper producing firm. After over a year of permanently ongoing negotiations, the world’s 
largest pulp firm was created, controlling a third of the world’s eucalyptus pulp market, with 
an annual capacity of 5.25 million tons of eucalyptus pulp.  
The transaction was made through cash and stock, being that VCP’s shareholder got 57.23% of 
Fibria while the rest would be owned by Aracruz’s shareholders. The firms also agreed that the 
voting rights would be split equally through the shareholders of the two firms. 
In terms of strategic rationale, the motivation behind the deal was similar to the deal of UPM 
and Myllylokoski. The firm’s wanted to consolidate the supply of pulp, with a joint initial 
market share of 30% in the global eucalyptus pulp market. Their paper operations were also 
integrated, thus broadening their paper product portfolio which allows targeting new markets. 
Scale economies achieved throughout the value chain were also a key area of value creation, 
mainly through cost efficiencies. The firms also forecasted financial synergies and an improved 
ability to generate cash-flows to tackle their highly geared capital structures.  
The firm adopted a cautionary at the potential synergies to be reaped. As such, the firms 
forecasted cost synergies in excess of €1 billion. No revenue synergies were considered to 
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justify the transaction, as the probability of materialization was somewhat uncertain and 
residual compared to the potential cost synergies. 
9. Merger 




The first step to value a merger transaction is to value the two entities to be combined before 
accounting for synergies created and integration costs to be incurred. This means that both 
financial statements are combined, with the resulting value being equal to the sum of the two 
companies separated. With the base case pro-forma financial statements and the enterprise 
values already calculated in the Valuation section, the enterprise value of the merged entity is 
calculated straightforwardly by adding them together without accounting for any changes 
whatsoever. There is however, two issues which must be most thoroughly understood: cost of 
capital and taxes. 
 Adding Suzano and Portucel financial statements and computing the resulting free cash-flows 
to the firm resulted in an Enterprise value for the company of €10.475 billion, including excess 
cash. By simply adding the Enterprise Value figures together, one would get roughly the same 
result (0.04% less). The equity value, on the other hand, is €5.691 billion, or €3.15 per share. 
The enterprise values considered were the DCF valuation results, the common model used to 
value both companies, thus allowing to combine the cost of capital, WACC in this case, more 
readily than if APV was used. 
Consolidating the P&L statement until EBIT is simply summing the two figures. From EBIT, 
taxes must be deducted to get the NOPLAT. To calculate taxes to be supported by the merged 
entity, the tax rate was computed as a weighted average of each firm EBIT. As such, the 
€ '000 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
€ 114,737     491,725    758,903     732,587     721,320     
Terminal Value € 9,930,230  




- Debt 4,784,345    
Equity Value 5,690,745    
# Shares 1,803,776    
Value per share 3.15              
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resulting tax value will be rather close to the 25% effective tax rate of Suzano, which 
contributes with 70% of total EBIT for the five years considered in the estimation period. 
Regarding the cost of capital, WACC was calculated without accounting for any synergies or 
variations of any kind.  Both companies have the same beta and target debt to market 
capitalization, therefore the same figures were considered. The merged entity equity market 
risk premium was computed by the weighted average of enterprise values, yielding a result of 
6.4%, once again close to the figure of Suzano - the equity market risk premium of Portucel is 
6.1% while that of Suzano is 6.5%. Finally, the cost of debt of the consolidated firm was 
calculated as a weighted average of each of the firm’s outstanding debt in 2013. This yielded a 
result of 4.6%. Inputting these changes and recalculating the WACC rate yields a result of 8.3%. 
9.2. Synergies 
The purpose of any merger is that the merged entity has higher value than the sum of both 
parts. The added value from the combination of two firms, the synergies, arises from the 
combination of operations as well as financial value creation. In this section, operational and 
financial synergies are proposed and discussed, with the former being broke down into cost 
and revenue synergies. The synergies proposed take into account the characteristics of the 
two industrial firms and similar mergers concluded in the industry. The last part of the section 
considers the costs arising from the integration of the two companies.  
9.2.1. Cost Synergies 
Scale economies 
Cost efficiencies are to be reaped through the consolidation of the two companies resulting in 
one with larger scale. As it is referred in the recent mergers section, one of the main drivers of 
the industry M&A activity is the achievement of scale economies which translate into higher 
operational margin through the decrease of operational expenses.  
Cost of Goods 
As it is shown in the two mergers discussed in the section, COGS decrease as a percentage of 
revenues when two firms with similar operations merge. The reduction, in the case of the 
proposed merger, will be achieved mainly through higher negotiation power with suppliers 
and larger quantity discounts. As both firms produce the same kinds of paper, they use the 
same suppliers. A 2% reduction in the weight of COGS in total revenues will be achieved as 
firms consolidate their purchase chemicals and other raw materials and exchange expertise in 
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their production processes. In absolute terms, the merger would allow for savings of around 
€130 million a year. 
 
These savings estimates lag the savings which could be achieved if firms’ industrial units were 
located in the same geographic region, as it was the case of UPM and Myllylokoski. 
Nevertheless, firms source their supplies globally, reason why purchasing can be centralized 
and then materials allocated between Portugal and Brazil.  
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses 
A merger typically generates the bulk of its cost synergies by savings in these types of costs, 
commonly known as overhead costs. Overhead costs go down by 17% on average after a 
merger of firms in the same industry and with similar size, according to a 2009 Deloitte study.. 
This merger will bring together two firms which are already large when compared to its peers. 
Both have highly professionalized processes which will overlap upon the merger. Indeed, as 
the firms have similar operations and generate revenues from products in the same segments, 
their corporate organization has overlapping areas, which will turn redundant upon the 
merger. First, the concentration of the head-office will generate annual savings in building 
rents. Although corporate offices in both countries will be maintained, it makes sense that the 
head-office will move to Brazil, where growth opportunities are located. Adding to it, areas 
such as IT, marketing and sales and distribution will be consolidated and reduced when they 
become redundant. R&D and product development will also benefit from consolidation. 
This will result in savings in administrative costs, rents and salaries, forecasted at 11% of 
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The benchmark used for the forecasted cost reductions and the post-merger reorganization of 
the head-offices was the 2012 acquisition of CIMPOR by Camargo Corrêa, which headquarters 
were established in Brazil and the marketing, IT and corporate support areas, among others, 
were significantly reduced. 
 
9.2.2. Revenue Synergies 
Revenue synergies depend more on external factors than cost synergies. They tend to take 
longer to achieve and are more exposed to changing market conditions. As revenue synergies 
have a higher degree of uncertainty than cost synergies, M&A deals relying on revenue growth 
to create value are viewed with skepticism. Nevertheless, these can be an important source of 
value in M&A deals, especially if both companies can complement their distribution channels 
or if their pricing power increases after the merger. 
Suzano and Portucel already operate at full capacity and are able to sell their entire output, 
meaning that any revenue synergies achieved in their existing operations must be created 
through higher average price sold. If quantities sold were to increase, that would necessary 
happen through capacity expansion – to illustrate that, a project NPV was developed and 
discussed in a separate section. 
Merging the distribution channels and product portfolios of Suzano and Portucel will create 
value through economies of scope, forecasted to be in the order of 1% increase in revenues 
per year, an extra €45 million a year from their forecasted revenues as standalone entities. 
While it is a marginal increase, with limited impact on firm value, a cautionary approach was 
used to estimate revenue synergies. This was based on historical examples where actual 
revenue increases where a fraction of estimated revenue before the acquisition. One extreme 
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case of revenue synergies failing to materialize was the merger of Alcatel and Lucent. While 
the rationale for the deal was improved competitive position and thus higher prices and 
number of customers, the combined entity actually decreased revenues substantially in a 
short-period of time after the deal was concluded. 
The firms will grow their combined revenues through economies of scope in two distinct ways. 
First, their combined product portfolios will serve its current customers better, with more 
purchasing options. Cross-selling is a rather obvious deal generation as the firms have products 
targeted for the same segments – mainly office and family customers for its Printing & Writing 
paper brands – but currently operate in distinct regions. Furthermore, up-selling, whereby a 
seller leads the customer to purchase more expensive, premium items, will also take place 
when the best-seller Navigator brand is marketed through Suzano’s distribution channels. 
Besides cross-selling and up-selling, the firm will be in an improved competitive position to 
target new markets with an enhanced product portfolio and a larger and more efficient 
distribution and logistics channels. Being one of the world’s largest Printing & Writing players, 
with state-of-the-art mills and a broad and high quality product portfolio, will mean a 
comparative advantage relatively to local players which can turn the merged firm into a 
successful incumbent in the markets neither are present currently, such as in fast-growing 
Asian markets. 
9.2.3. Financial Synergies 
Financial synergies can create substantial value in mergers & acquisitions. These are the result 
of the combination of relative financial strengths of each entity and translate into lower cost of 
capital or a step up in cash-flows.   
This merger will combine Portucel, a firm with excess cash, low leverage and stable positive 
free cash-flows but lacking investment opportunities to deploy its resources and Suzano, a firm 
with plentiful growth opportunities, being in the world’s most attractive location to invest in 
the pulp and paper industry, but using all its free cash flows to reduce its leverage, which is 
currently in unsustainable levels should paper and pulp prices fall. A merger would eliminate 
this underinvestment problem, and allow the new entity to pursue new industrial projects in 
Brazil. The merged entity would enjoy improved leverage ratios – the interest coverage ratio 
would increase by 1.3x upon the merger – which would make the deleveraging less urgent. 
Furthermore, Portucel has excess cash which could be used either to decrease debt 
outstanding or finance capital expenditures.  
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While it is difficult to measure the impact of this synergy beforehand, it is assumed that the 
merged firm will develop a paper mill in Brazil using Portucel’s excess cash and forecasted free 
cash flows in 2014 and 2015. The results of the project are shown in section of synergies. 
There are several other ways this type of synergies can materialize. One such way is the 
reduction of the cost of capital as operations are more diversified and, as a result, cash-flows 
are more stable and so the cost of equity and/or the cost of debt drop. The proposed merger 
won’t produce such synergies as the two firms’ earnings - as well as costs - are highly 
correlated, as they depend on the same indexes. If anything, geographical diversification – 
Suzano is exposed to the Latin America and Portucel to Europe - could yield a lower cost of 
capital. However, pulp and paper prices as well as raw materials costs are highly correlated 
globally, which makes geographical diversification an unrealistic source of value. 
The other common types of financial synergies are also either residual or outright inexistent. 
Tax losses carry forwards, the ability of a firm to deduct losses incurred in past years when it 
has profits, can have generate some value in 2014 as Suzano had negative net income in 2013. 
However, these losses were minimal which means that deductions will be either inexistent or 
residual.  
9.2.4. Capitalize on Portucel mill development expertise and use excess cash 
The two firms could combine their strengths to develop a paper industrial facility mill in Brazil, 
producing Portucel’s premium paper products to be distributed to Brazil and South American 
markets. This has long been a project of Portucel management, which acknowledges the fact 
that it has to diversify its production base to reach more customers. Furthermore, it enhances 
the value of Suzano through the integration of more pulp and the retention of Portucel 
expertise in developing mills which can use in its existing units. 
The paper products Portucel carries in its portfolio are among the most premium priced papers 
in Europe, where the firm distributes the bulk of its best-selling, premium paper brand, the 
office paper Navigator. Besides being able to charge a higher pricing due to differentiation, the 
premium paper segment is highly resilient to index price changes. It comes as no surprise that 
every firm seeks to increase the quality of their products, usually through changes in the 
manufacturing process of paper of by changing the type of pulp used, with the ultimate goal of 
placing a larger percentage of their revenues in the premium segment.  
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While Portucel is not able to increase its paper output, Suzano on the other hand, has plentiful 
opportunities to expand organically in its paper segment. Besides, it is the leading paper 
distributor in Brazil and has a strong presence throughout South America. The new paper unit 
to be jointly developed would capitalize on Portucel expertise and would produce premium 
printing & writing paper products such as the Navigator brand.  
The development of a paper mill would be located near one of the existing pulp mills, which 
output could be integrated into the paper mill. It is estimated that it has a similar construction 
cost than the paper mill Portucel developed in 2011, the Setubal mill. The investment is to be 
financed with a debt issue in the same amount and a new mill typically takes two years to 
become operational.  
The revenues accruing from the new mill in 2016 and thereof are estimated through the 
forecasts set out in the forecasts section. The operating margin (EBITDA margin) is 15% in 2016 
and 25% thereof as fixed costs are diluted when the mill operates at full capacity. In terms of 
discount rate of the project, the WACC rate of the merged entity assuming no synergies is 




9.3. Integration Costs 
M&A deals are not all about synergies as these come at the cost of integrating the two 
companies together. Integration of two companies is more than integrating two entities – 
€ '000 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e 2019e 2020e
Revenues € 289,793  417,962  422,429  427,921  433,484     
Paper price € 828        836        845        856        867           
Capacity thousand tons 350        500        500        500        500           
EBITDA € 43,469    104,490  105,607  106,980  108,371     
margin % 15% 25% 25% 25% 25%
D&A € 16,667    16,667    16,667    16,667    16,667       
DEPR % 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
EBIT € 26,802    87,824    88,941    90,314    91,704       
taxes % 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
NOPAT € 20,102    65,868    66,705    67,735    68,778       
Investment in WC € 14,490    6,408      223        275        278           
D&A € 16,667    16,667    16,667    16,667    16,667       
CAPEX € 250,000 - 250,000 - - - - 5,500      5,500        
€ 231,077 - 213,587 - 22,279    76,126    83,149    78,627    79,667       
Terminal Value 1% € 1,108,194  
€ 231,077 - 213,587 - 17,593    55,565    56,097    49,032    684,679     
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indeed, the way finance functions are integrated differs from what it takes to consolidate the 
R&D activities of two companies. Other key integration areas include sales and marketing, 
operations, human resources and IT and technology. To assess integration costs, it is important 
to draft a plan on how each of these areas will be integrated and derive a budget from there, 
understanding the timing and cost linked to the necessary reorganization. Besides these costs, 
there are upfront fees incurred with lawyers, consultants and other professional services 
providers whom support and manage the process.  
In an Ernst&Young (2014) study, a survey shows that merging firms spent an average of 14% of 
combined revenues in integration, spanning over the first two years. While this is used a 
benchmark for this deal there are two specificities in this deal which are the basis to estimate 
integration costs at 10% (€355 million) of combined revenues in 2013, distributed by €213 
million (60%) in 2014 and €142 million (40%) in 2015.  
Firstly, the average size of the firms surveyed in the study, in terms of sales, is €256 million – 
Suzano and Portucel combined turnover was €3.5 billion in 2013. However comparable, scale 
economies arise in integration costs, too.  
Secondly, the proposed merger won’t be as complete a merger what is observed in other 
industries, because Suzano and Portucel can only merge their operations partially contrary to 
other industries where operations are completely integrated. Both firms operations can be 
described as transforming wood and other raw materials in pulp and paper. As Suzano and 
Portucel have their industrial units in different locations and they cannot be integrated in any 
conceivable way. As such, the mills in Portugal and Brazil will continue to operate 
independently after the merger and no integration costs will arise as operations will remain 
unchanged. 
9.4. Valuation of the merged firm 
Following laying out the assumptions and estimates of the synergies that this merger will yield 
and calculating the NPV of the project to be undertook by the merged firm, in this section the 
value it will create to the firm is investigated. From the starting point of the valuation of the 
merged entity without synergies, Enterprise value is added of synergies and deducted of 
integration costs. Finally, the NPV of the project is added to enterprise value. Each synergy is 
added ceteris paribus in order to assess the impact of each individually on Enterprise Value. 
The integration costs, estimated at €355 million over two years, are deducted in all cases, 
meaning that the enterprise value with each synergy is already net of integration costs. 
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9.4.1. Synergy Valuation 
 
 
Starting from the enterprise value without synergies, the first adjustment made was to deduct 
integration costs out of the base valuation without synergies. ´The rationale to deduct 
integration costs beforehand is to obtain the value which each synergy above integration 
costs. This way, it is possible to calculate enterprise value as if that was the only synergy to 
materialize after the merger. The valuation without synergies column did not suffered any 
adjustment whatsoever. Integration costs have a negative impact in the order of €318 million 
on enterprise value, close to its actual cost because they occur in 2014 and 2015.  
The synergies were incorporated individually from top to bottom, meaning that revenue 
synergies were accounted for firstly. Regarding the 1% increase in revenues which was 
estimated in the Synergies section the value of the synergy calculated above integration costs 
amounts to €45.6 million (or €354 million without accounting for integration costs). Revenue 
synergies have a weight of 7% on total synergies calculated. 
Scale economies in the cost of goods sold, the cost with the most weight in both firms’ cost 
structure, will be the main source of value creation. This is a variable cost which depends on 
quantities sold and it is often a key driver of value creation in mergers, as economies of scale 
accruing to the larger firm are reflected on this item. In this merger, it accounts for more than 
half total value created (77% or €482 million).  
Synergy Source Value of synergy with synergies w/o synergies
Revenue 45,631                10,520,721   10,475,090  
COGS 482,200              10,957,290   10,475,090  
S,G&A 102,028              10,577,118   10,475,090  
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Lastly, Sales, General and Administrative costs will also be reduced in the combined entity. 
These costs are mainly fixed costs, although they have a variable component as well. It is 
assumed that the merged firm will be able to trimmer expenses in this item, in the ways 
already outlined in the previous section (see Synergies section). In total, enterprise value will 
increase €420 million which means that value created after integration costs will amount to 
€102 million. In relative terms, S, G&A costs account for 16% of total value created net of 
integration costs. 
The enterprise value resulting from the incorporation of the value generated by the synergies 
is €11.1 billion, €630 million or 6% more than the case with no synergies and integration costs,  
9.4.2. Valuation accounting for the new project 
 
Accounting for the paper mill to be jointly developed in Brazil, the total value created in the 
merger would surpass €1 billion, already net of integration costs. As a result, the combined 
enterprise value will be €11.5 billion, and the equity value, calculated subtracting the debt 
outstanding of both firms, will be €6.7 billion. This enterprise value is 10% higher than the 
enterprise value of the two firms combined as standalone entities. 
9.4.3. Operating sense of synergies 
After valuing the synergies using the DCF model – and the valuation of the merged entity – the 
following step is to ensure that this value makes operating sense. This means that the 
synergies proposed ought to be criticized in the way they adhere to the characteristics of the 
firms being merged. The set of synergies proposed is said to be reasonable if the benchmark 
transactions occurred in the past have led to similar outcomes than what is expected in this 
merger. The analysis is supported by the framework of Sirower and Sahni (2006), which is 
detailed in the literature review section.  
Merging Portucel and Suzano will yield a combination of cost and revenue synergies, the latter 
with a reduced weight because the firms do not have ability to expand production with their 
current capacity. With the construction of a new mill, they will be able to fully reap the 
benefits of the enhanced competitive position and improved market access, thus generating 
value which neither could achieve standalone.  It is also of important to realize at this point 
NPV of the project 418,302              
Total EV Value inc. project 11,523,252        
Total Value Created 1,048,161           
Equity Value 6,738,906           
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that most synergies will be arising from the paper segment – paper distribution, paper brand 
portfolios, paper R&D and sales processes will become the main enhanced areas through the 
merger. However, as pulp is integrated in paper production, the allocation of synergies 
between segments becomes difficult and unclear. Besides, both companies pulp segment will 
also yield direct synergies from combining R&D expenses and raw material purchases. 
Applying the methodology of Sirower and Sahni (2006) it is possible to observe graphically that 
this merger brings together new capabilities and market access. The former in terms of mill 
developing expertise and processes which are interchanged between the two companies and 
the latter in terms of targeting new markets where each firm is established and also an 
improved competitive position to target new, fast-growing markets in Latin America and Asia. 
While the synergies estimated are mainly cost synergies, the development of the new mill in 
Brazil will improve revenues to an extent that none firm could achieve as a standalone firm. 
Although these are not synergies, it is a value creation nonetheless and therefore included in 
the value created by the merger as part of revenue synergies. Accounting for that, the weight 
of revenue synergies increases in total synergies and it can be concluded that the merger value 
created makes sense applying the methodology. 
 
9.5. The Acquisition 
9.5.1. Bidder and target definition 
A merger between Suzano and Portucel would maximize value by being a friendly merger, with 
the agreement of shareholders from both parties. This is particularly important considering 
that Suzano Papel e Celulose is controlled by Grupo Suzano, a Brazilian conglomerate, and 
Portucel is controlled by Pedro Queiroz Pereira through Semapa and Seinpar, which together 
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dependent on the two groups reaching an agreement. In order to engage the two groups in a 
friendly deal, they must retain control of the merged firm, with the two holding groups 
agreeing on sharing control. 
Being a friendly acquisition, the bidder would be Suzano, due to its relatively larger size 
compared to Portucel and as its shares appear overvalued when compared to the valuation 
performed. This would give them an incentive to use stock in the deal, based on the accretive 
earnings argument outlined in the literature review section.  
A cash offer would not serve the purpose as that would mean an acquisition of Portucel, by 
Suzano. An acquisition would have to be hostile because Pedro Queiroz Pereira, through 
Semapa and Seinpar, has repeatedly stated that it envisages maintaining a controlling stake in 
Portucel. It is thus likely that Mr. Queiroz Pereira would be interested in sharing control of the 
merged firm with Suzano, if they are able to agree on the management and vision for the firm. 
9.5.2. Distribution of the synergies 
The value created by synergies must be allocated to the company responsible for bringing the 
assets or capabilities into the merger in order to evaluate share of the synergies each firm 
should own after the merger. However, it has been found that, historically, bidders tend to 
forgo a part of the synergies they create in the benefit of targets, which are in turn earning a 
higher value than the synergies they are responsible for. 
The bidder, Suzano, will bring its organic growth opportunities to the merger. The firm has the 
forestry assets and the market power in South America to expand its business in the paper 
segment. In terms of the pulp segment, the firm is able to produce at a lower cost than 
Portucel, as well as most other industry players, due to its large scale and ability to produce 
eucalyptus wood at low cost.  
On the other hand, Portucel has the most efficient mill in Europe and extensive expertise in 
developing paper and energy mills inexpensively. Adding to it, its paper products have a lot of 
perceived quality, illustrated by the fact that the firm generates most of its sales in the 
premium segment. These brands will have future demand in the markets where Suzano is 
already established, which are expanding its premium segments as economies develop and 
purchasing power increases, as shown in the industry review section. 
Negotiation Power – BATNA approach 
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The negotiation power of each firm weighs in on synergy distribution – if one firm can achieve 
a similar result by other means or if it has less to benefit from the deal proposed, that firm is 
able to negotiate from a position of higher power. To assess the position the firms enter into 
the negotiations, the Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) methodology is used 
Roger and William (2011). Through this methodology, negotiation power is given by the 
alternatives a firm has if the current negotiation fails. It can be seen as a leverage point during 
negotiations because a firm should not accept a deal creating value below its best alternative.   
The need of doing the proposed deal can be observed considering how firms are operating 
currently, as separate companies. Portucel has been able to achieve higher margins than the 
industry and freeing cash flows sufficient to pay dividends and accumulating cash, while 
maintaining lower debt levels than the industry. However, it has reached a plateau in revenue 
growth and lack opportunities to deploy its resources and expand. Suzano has been able to 
sustain its operating margin above the industry and it can be said to one of the world’s firms 
with more growth opportunities, due to its extensive availability of raw material and 
consolidated pulp and paper distribution channels worldwide. However, its leverage levels are 
unsustainable and the high cost of borrowing has made the company struggling to be 
profitable – in the last two years, it reported losses.  
To address the above mentioned problems, the proposed deal is adequate, although other 
deals are possible. Suzano could try to cope with its leverage problems on its own as the new 
mill generates more free cash flows to service debt. Alternatively, it can partner with another 
firm in Europe or North America which would have the means and capabilities required to 
pursue the investments and market expansion available, while creating scale economies. 
Portucel could also encounter other players with growth opportunities which it can add value 
to and achieve scale economies – these firms are found either in Brazil or other country with 
low pulp costs and a growing market. 
In conclusion, both firms contribute to the synergies in similar terms and the negotiation 
power is equivalent. As a result, the value created in the merger should be divided 
proportionally, as a percentage of their standalone equity valuation through DCF. Specifically, 
Portucel will earn 46% of the synergies and Suzano the remaining 54%. 
9.5.3. Method of payment 
The method of payment chosen for an acquisition conveys a lot of information about the 
bidder’s intentions and views about its own firm and the target alike. Specifically, the decision 
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between using cash or stock as the payment method has to do with how firm value is 
understood, the synergies to be realized and the stock price of the acquirer and the target. If 
the bidder’s stock price is perceived as overvalued relatively to the target’s stock price, using 
its stock rather than cash is cheaper. The decision also has to do with control – if the bidder’s 
management believes it can create value through controlling the merged firm, cash should be 
used. In other words, if the managers of the bidder believe they can manage the target firm 
better than it is currently, value of control exists. These issues are discussed thoroughly in the 
literature review section. 
Historically, it has been found that cash-based deals significantly outperform those with stock 
as the primary method of payment. The common explanation for this fact is that the market 
regards cash deals as more trustworthy, as it is a sign of the bidder’s confidence in the deal. 
Indeed, if the deal is financed with debt and synergies fail to materialize, the firm can 
experience financial distress. More recently, low borrowing costs and the global cash balances 
accumulated in recent years has served as an incentive to use cash for acquisitions. 
It seems that using cash as the method of payment in M&A is the default option in any deal, 
because initial returns are higher and that better performance persists through the medium 
term (1 to 2 years, at least).  If the acquirer opts for the use of equity, this decision must be 
backed by strong evidence that it is effectively the right option. Otherwise, failing to support 
this decision with a clear rationale and value added proposal may dictate a negative market 
reaction, translated in stock price drops, which are found to be very difficult to revert over 
time.  
The proposed merger will be an equity deal, with Suzano offering to acquire Portucel 
exclusively with stock. This method of payment is suitable for Suzano for a number of reasons, 
some of which were already explained in the Bidder and target definition section. Firstly, there 
is the willingness of both party shareholders to share control of the merged firm. Besides, 
Suzano stock appears overvalued, accordingly to the valuation – the share closed at R$ 9.24 on 
30 December 2013 while the fair value for each share was found to be R$ 8.06, implying an 
overvaluation of 15%.  
The use of stock instead of cash is also preferable because the leverage ratios of the merged 
entity. With the use of stock, Suzano would not have to raise debt to finance the acquisition. 
This, in turn, will mean that the interest coverage ratio of the merged firm, already accounting 
for synergies, will stand at 4.5x, enough to be awarded a rating of BBB Damodaran (2010) (see 
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appendix 4). If cash were to be used, and assuming that Suzano would finance the acquisition 
entirely with debt, the rating would be much lower than BBB, with the surge of debt levels and 
consequent interest payments. In fact, it is uncertain that Suzano would be able to raise 
enough debt to finance the acquisition at all. Assuming the availability of debt financing, the 
merged firm would have a coverage ratio below 2.5x, which corresponds to a rating of B (see 
appendix 4), meaning the merged firm would not be awarded an investment grade rating (only 
credit ratings above BBB are considered investment grade). 
9.5.4. Takeover offer 
The offer will be a tender offer, targeted directly at Portucel shareholders. The ultimate 
decision will be of the shareholders, not management. The deal must be welcomed by the 
shareholders as a friendly deal, particularly by the Semapa and Seinpar, the holdings which 
control 75% of Portucel. With 46% of the merged firm, Portucel shareholders, and the market 
in general, are likely to regard this as a fair deal. In fact, with this deal, shares of Portucel are 
valued at €4.32, a 49% premium over stock price at December 2013, and an 18% premium 
over the estimated fair value of €3.65. 
The fact that this offer will only proceed with the agreement of the shareholders of the 
controlling holdings will put pressure on the remaining shareholders to regard the deal as 
friendly and support the bid. It must also be made clear that this deal is preferably to a cash 
deal because, one, target shareholders will have access to the value created in the merger and, 
two, due to the leverage restrictions faced by Suzano, the deal is only possible with stock as 
method of payment. Furthermore, the deal must be regarded as an unique opportunity to not 
only diversify their geographic exposure but to set a new path of growth for Portucel, which 
has reached a plateau in terms of revenue growth. 
The total acquisition price will amount to €3.108 billion, corresponding to €4.32 per share. 
Semapa and Seinpar will own 35% of the new firm and, being the largest shareholder. 
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9.5.5. SVAR 
To compute SVAR, the premium paid is divided by the acquirer market value before the 
merger. The result is the percentage of shareholders’ equity at risk if synergies end up being 
null. As this is an all-stock deal, the formula is adjusted to incorporate the fact that the 
acquirer will only bear the synergy risk corresponding to its equity in the merged firm. The 
resulting SVAR for Suzano’s shareholders is 16.9%. 
9.5.6. Other Potential Bidders 
M&A deals often build up competition as alternative bids arise, leaving target shareholders 
with more than one deal to choose from, which can differ not only in price but in other terms. 
Consequently, the success of an acquirer in concluding a transaction, and the terms it is 
concluded, is affected by the alternative bids that arise along the takeover process. It is thus of 
paramount importance to be aware other potential bidders beforehand. These can be divided 
into two broad categories – bidders who can create synergies from the merger, commonly 
denominated strategic acquirers, and bidders capable of adding value in other ways apart from 
synergies, denominated financial bidders. 
Financial bidders are private equity funds who, in this case, would be interested in acquiring 
Portucel, taking it private and create value through operational or financial enhancements and 
then divest, either through an IPO or sale of the firm, as a whole or in parts, in a private 
transaction, having a target rate of return on their investment (IRR). These types of funds can 
target all types of companies or be focused in specific industries, geographic regions or in a 
specific stage of the life cycle. Given the recent increased weight of deals private equity funds 
in total deals KPMG (2013), and the fact that a few private equity deals were recently 
concluded in Portugal, financial bidders are likely to be interested in this deal and therefore 
must be regarded as potential competition. 
Acquisition Price 3,108,385    
Acquisition Price per share 4.32               
Premium over market price 55%
Total Value of equity 6,738,906    
% in the new company:
- Suzano (Acquirer) 54%
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Regarding the strategic bidders which must be considered, the lot is composed of paper 
companies looking to achieve scale and scope through acquisitions. UPM and Stora Enso, two 
of the world’s largest paper companies, would be suitable acquirers. Besides the ability by 
either firm to integrate Portucel in a much larger organization spread across the globe, these 
firms have a track record of acquiring European companies in the paper industry. Furthermore, 
their inability to grow organically and their pursuit of scale economies and industry integration 
leads analysts to agree that these firms will be acquiring in the near future Rosendahl (2013).  
A merger between Portucel and Altri, a Portugal based pulp and paper producer, would also 
make strategic sense. The two firms have their industrial facilities in Portugal and have similar 
operations, although Altri is significantly smaller than Portucel (Altri’s market capitalization 
stood at €500 million in the end of 2013). The two firms already cooperate in certain area, 
such as forest management and energy production, and its combination could yield significant 
synergies, especially on the cost side. 
9.5.7. Execution Risk 
Successfully deliver the value promised to shareholders in a M&A deal is one of the hardest 
challenges in today’s business and the complexity present in a deal is far higher than it was a 
decade ago. As discussed in the Literature Review section a deal can be segmented into three 
sub-stages, pre-merger, during the merger and post-merger, which have different challenges 
and involve different players, both internal and external to the firm. 
In the pre-merger stage, the uncertainty and the subjective perceptions of the people affected 
by the merger creates the risk of the deal falling through at this stage, if the parties involved 
fail to agree on a plan of action and previously negotiated terms. In order to align goals and 
devise a plan to proceed to the next stage, management must identify the sources of 
uncertainty and mitigate the subjectivity of perceptions through an identification of the key 
variables which can compromise the deal, which is the due diligence stage. With that 
information, management should communicate the implications of the merger, shareholders 
and employees, once the deal is concluded.  Possible legal barriers are also an issue to be 
resolved at this stage. 
The merger stage begins once the merger is officially announced. Over this stage, a merger 
timeframe must be defined and the roles and responsibilities in the merged firm must be 
defined. During the stage, information must be communicated as soon as it is known and the 
changes starting once the merger is concluded must be addressed internally and to the 
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market.  Finally, in the post-merger stage, actual integration of the two firms begins. At this 
point many risks can materialize, especially in the form of conflicts between management 
and/or employees from each firm and the emergence of new information with impact on the 
value proposed before the merger.  
The proposed merger will be affected by the abovementioned risks, as all mergers are. 
Nevertheless, there are two types of risk that are likely to arise and must be discussed in 
further detail. Cultural risk can be defined as the possibility of conflicts among each firm’s 
managers and employees arising. Indeed, cross-border deals more than often entail this kind 
of risk, as discussed in the Literature Review section. The proposed merger will bring together 
two organizational structures which have their own processes and business culture. Although 
many deals between Portuguese and Brazilian companies happened in the past, a plan must 
be devised to identify and mitigate the sources of this risk. Additionally, the pre-merger stage 
is of particular importance as neither firm as an acquisition track-record. With the lack of 
established deal-making processes in either side, it is likely that without a structured and clear 
plan from the outset, managers and shareholders might lose their focus and disrupt the deal 
momentum.   
10. Conclusion 
There has been recently a wave of M&A deals in the pulp and paper industry fuelled by two 
main rationales: concentrate supply in mature markets and seek growth through acquisitions 
in growing markets in emerging countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The 
rationale of the proposed transaction falls into the latter category. 
The review of the industry and the two companies to be merged provided the basis to support 
the strategic rationale that this merger will create value by combining firms with similar 
business models but operating in rather differently environments. Portucel has been successful 
in its specialization of producing premium paper products in Portugal and distribute them 
across Europe. Suzano, on the other hand, has been able to capitalize on its relative advantage 
in pulp production to be profitable and growing organically through industrial development in 
Brazil.  
The proposed merger will enhance Suzano’s ability to pursue the vast growth opportunities 
which still present in Brazil while it allows Portucel to depart from its inability to expand 
operations and increase revenues. Value will be created mainly through cost efficiencies in the 
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value chain, higher selling prices due to increased market power and the joint development of 
industrial operations in Brazil to increase paper production. 
It is concluded that Suzano should acquire Portucel in an all-stock offer, valuing the Portuguese 
firm at €4.32, a premium of 55% over its 31 December 2013 market capitalization. Through the 
proposed takeover offer, Portucel would be entitled to 46% of the merged firm, with the 
remaining 54% allocated to Suzano’s shareholders.  
11. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Balance Sheet and Cash-Flow Statement – Portucel 
 
 
Balance Sheet 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Assets
Non-Current Assets 1,838,588€            1,755,321€   1,656,085€   1,615,923€   1,621,196€   1,629,523€   
Goodwill 376,756€               376,756€      376,756€      376,756€      376,756€      376,756€      
O. Intangible Assets 3,350€                   -€              -€              -€              -€              -€              
Plant, Property and Equipment 1,316,186€            1,241,385€   1,182,776€   1,140,610€   1,115,808€   1,108,547€   
Biological Assets 111,339€               111,339€      111,339€      111,339€      111,339€      111,339€      
Available-for-sale financial Assets 229€                      -€              -€              -€              -€              -€              
Current Assets 981,082€               991,961€      1,003,371€   999,731€      975,847€      966,860€      
Inventories 202,925€               208,265€      199,076€      192,951€      183,763€      183,763€      
Accounts Recievables 200,812€               216,989€      222,709€      236,201€      240,458€      245,028€      
State Entities 53,050€                 53,050€        53,050€        53,050€        53,050€        53,050€        
Cash and Cash Equivalents 524,294€               513,657€      528,535€      517,529€      498,576€      485,018€      
Total Assets 2,819,669€            2,747,283€   2,659,456€   2,615,655€   2,597,043€   2,596,382€   
Liabilities and Equity
Non-Current Liabilities 966,489€               732,402€      829,283€      831,154€      843,548€      856,853€      
Deferred Taxes 99,280€                 99,280€        99,280€        99,280€        99,280€        99,280€        
Provisions 49,317€                 -€              -€              -€              -€              -€              
Interest-bearing Liabilities 771,632€               588,863€      685,744€      687,616€      700,009€      713,314€      
O. Liabilities 46,259€                 44,259€        44,259€        44,259€        44,259€        44,259€        
Current Liabilities 373,355€               580,567€      463,368€      457,657€      451,210€      454,154€      
Accounts Payable 201,053€               208,265€      199,076€      192,951€      183,763€      183,763€      
Interest-bearing Liabilities 59,702€                 259,702€      151,692€      152,106€      154,848€      157,791€      
State Entities 112,600€               112,600€      112,600€      112,600€      112,600€      112,600€      
Total Liabilities 1,339,844€            1,312,969€   1,292,651€   1,288,811€   1,294,758€   1,311,007€   
Share Capital 767,500€               767,500€      767,500€      767,500€      767,500€      767,500€      
Treasury Shares 94,305-€                 94,305-€        94,305-€        94,305-€        94,305-€        94,305-€        
Legal Reserves 75,266€                 75,266€        75,266€        75,266€        75,266€        75,266€        
Currency Translation Reserves 1,297-€                   1,000€          1,000€          1,000€          1,000€          1,000€          
Retained Earnings 522,172€               530,846€      476,943€      427,802€      390,407€      366,045€      
Net Profit for the Period 210,038€               154,008€      140,401€      149,580€      162,417€      169,870€      
Total Equity 1,479,374€            1,434,315€   1,366,805€   1,326,843€   1,302,285€   1,285,375€   
Total Equity + Liabilities 2,819,218€            2,747,283€   2,659,456€   2,615,655€   2,597,043€   2,596,382€   
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Appendix 2: Balance Sheet and Cash-Flow Statement – Suzano Papel e Celulose 
 
 
Statement of Cash Flows 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Operating Activities
  Net Income 210,042€        154,008€        140,401€        149,580€        162,417€        169,870€        
  Depreciation & Amortization 102,821€        114,401€        113,323€        112,705€        112,569€        112,958€        
  Changes in non cash WC 15,000€          14,304€          5,720€            13,491€          4,257€            4,571€            
Others 31,000€          
Cash flows from operations 328,863€        254,106€        248,004€        248,793€        270,729€        278,257€        
Investment Activities
CAPEX 19,217€          39,601€          54,714€          70,538€          87,767€          105,696€        
Cash flows from investments 19,217€          39,601€          54,714€          70,538€          87,767€          105,696€        
Financing Activities
Net Borrowings Variation 120,000€        17,230€          11,129-€          2,286€            15,135€          16,249€          
Dividends and Reserves 201,364€        207,911€        189,542€        186,975€        186,780€        169,870€        
Cash flows from financing 81,364€          225,142€        200,671€        189,261€        201,914€        186,119€        
Cash&Cash Equivalents Variation 228,281€        10,637-€          7,380-€            11,006-€          18,953-€          13,558-€          
Cash&Cash Eq. Beginning of the period 329,368€        524,294€        534,930€        527,550€        538,556€        557,509€        
Cash&Cash Eq. End of the period 557,650€        534,930€        527,550€        538,556€        557,509€        571,067€        
Balance Sheet 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Assets
Non-Current Assets 6,347,715€  6,596,190€  6,637,398€  6,578,994€  6,525,333€  6,477,889€  
Investments 18,858€       18,858€       18,858€       18,858€       18,858€       18,858€       
Plant, Property and Equipment 4,953,545€  5,202,020€  5,243,227€  5,184,824€  5,131,163€  5,083,719€  
Biological Assets 1,038,055€  1,038,055€  1,038,055€  1,038,055€  1,038,055€  1,038,055€  
O. Fixed Assets 337,257€     337,257€     337,257€     337,257€     337,257€     337,257€     
Current Assets 1,986,704€  1,863,559€  1,986,693€  1,837,704€  1,790,388€  1,885,832€  
Inventories 277,898€     352,023€     373,632€     343,992€     343,914€     350,621€     
Accounts Recievables 452,536€     516,298€     577,400€     528,312€     514,397€     510,704€     
Cash and Cash Equivalents 1,132,655€  871,624€     912,046€     841,785€     808,462€     900,892€     
O. Current Assets 123,615€     123,615€     123,615€     123,615€     123,615€     123,615€     
Total Assets 8,334,419€  8,459,749€  8,624,091€  8,416,698€  8,315,721€  8,363,721€  
Liabilities and Equity
Non-Current Liabilities 4,353,233€  4,455,496€  4,119,693€  3,867,180€  3,801,752€  3,462,120€  
Interest-bearing Liabilities 3,643,405€  3,745,668€  3,409,866€  3,157,353€  3,091,925€  2,752,292€  
O. Long-term Liabilities 709,827€     709,827€     709,827€     709,827€     709,827€     709,827€     
Current Liabilities 700,347€     717,780€     1,052,773€  953,152€     742,941€     955,253€     
Accounts Payable 269,087€     245,017€     245,017€     245,017€     245,017€     245,017€     
Interest-bearing Liabilities 309,605€     297,737€     685,802€     602,513€     415,428€     639,633€     
Other ST Liabilities 121,654€     175,025€     121,953€     105,622€     82,495€       70,603€       
Total Liabilities 5,053,580€  5,173,275€  5,172,466€  4,820,333€  4,544,693€  4,417,373€  
Share Capital 1,916,110€  1,916,110€  1,916,110€  1,916,110€  1,916,110€  1,916,110€  
Retained Earnings & Legal Reserves 1,364,687€  1,252,352€  1,311,358€  1,423,437€  1,551,846€  1,703,382€  
Net Profit for the Period 118,012€     224,157€     256,819€     303,072€     326,857€     
Total Equity 3,280,797€  3,286,474€  3,451,625€  3,596,365€  3,771,028€  3,946,348€  
Total Equity + Liabilities 8,334,377€  8,459,749€  8,624,091€  8,416,698€  8,315,720€  8,363,721€  
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Appendix 3: Coverage Ratio and Credit Ratings 
 
 
Appendix 4: Beta Calculations 
Statement of Cash Flows 2013 2014e 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e
All values in € '000
Operating Activities
  Net Income 77,286-€       118,012€     224,157€     256,819€     303,072€     326,857€     
  Depreciation & Amortization 311,785€     329,435€     334,102€     333,881€     333,892€     334,224€     
  Changes in non cash WC 303,660€     161,958€     82,711€       78,728-€       13,993-€       3,014€         
Other non-cash adjustments 83,435€       -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
Cash flows from operations 621,594€     285,489€     475,548€     669,428€     650,956€     658,067€     
Investment Activities
Capital Expenditures 582,740€     577,909€     375,310€     275,477€     280,231€     286,780€     
Disposal and decrease in investments 116,824€     -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
Additions in biological assets 208,655-€     -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
Cash flows from investments 674,571-€     577,909€     375,310€     275,477€     280,231€     286,780€     
Financing Activities
Increase in LT Borrowings 1,446,059€  400,000€     350,000€     350,000€     350,000€     300,000€     
Decrease in LT Borrowings 998,802-€     297,737€     685,802€     602,513€     415,428€     639,633€     
ST Borrowings variation -€             11,868€       388,065-€     83,290€       187,085€     224,205-€     
Dividends and Reserves 35,049-€       59,006€       112,079€     128,409€     151,536€     163,428€     
Other financing activities 20,900€       -€             -€             -€             -€             -€             
Cash flows from financing 433,108€     31,389-€       59,816€       464,212€     404,049€     278,856€     
Cash&Cash Equivalents Variation 380,131€     261,032-€     40,423€       70,261-€       33,323-€       92,430€       
Cash&Cash Eq. Beginning of the period 1,512,786€  1,132,655€  871,624€     912,046€     841,785€     808,462€     
Cash&Cash Eq. End of the period 1,132,655€  871,624€     912,046€     841,785€     808,462€     900,892€     
Coverage Rating Default Spread
>12,5x AAA 0.8%
9.5x - 12.5x AA 1.3%
7.5x - 9.5x A+ 1.4%
6x - 7.5x A 1.5%
4.5x - 6x A- 1.7%
4x - 4.5x BBB 2.5%
3.5x - 4x BB+ 3.2%
3x - 3.5x BB 3.7%
2.5x - 3x B+ 4.5%
2x - 2.5x B 5.7%
1.5x - 2x B- 6.5%
1.25x - 1.5x CCC 7.5%
0.8x - 1.25x CC 10.0%
0.5x - 0.8x C 12.0%
<0.65x D 20.0%
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